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SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: [REDACTED]

Thursday, January 20, 2022

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held via Webex, commencing at 1:01 p.m.
Present: Representative Lofgren.

1

2 Appearances:

3

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5 For the SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

6 THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL:

7

8 [REDACTED] INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

9 [REDACTED], PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

10 [REDACTED] SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

11 [REDACTED], INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

12 [REDACTED] CHIEF INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

1

2 [REDACTED] Good afternoon, everyone.

3 This is an interview of Colonel [REDACTED], conducted by the House Select
4 Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol, pursuant to
5 House Resolution 503.

6 Colonel [REDACTED], could you please state your full name and spell your name for the
7 record?

8 Colonel [REDACTED] Yes. [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED] And I will introduce everyone who is on the call today from our
10 end.

11 We have Senior Investigative Counsel for the Select Committee [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] We have Professional Staff Member [REDACTED] And also
13 Investigative Counsel [REDACTED] from the select committee.

14 [REDACTED] Thanks, Colonel Hunter, for joining.

15 Colonel [REDACTED] Okay. Thank you.

16 [REDACTED] This will be a staff-led interview, and members, of course, may
17 choose to also ask questions if any of them join the call. My name is [REDACTED] and
18 I'm an investigative counsel for the select committee.

19 Before we begin, I'd like to describe a few ground rules.

20 There is an official reporter transcribing the record of this interview. Please wait
21 until each question is completed before you begin your response and we will try to wait
22 until your response is complete before we ask our next question.

23 I also want to acknowledge for the record that Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren has
24 joined the call.

25 The stenographer cannot record nonverbal responses, such as shaking your head.

1 So it is important that you answer each question with an audible, verbal response.

2 We ask that you provide complete answers based on your best recollection. If
3 the question is not clear, please ask for clarification. If you do not know the answer,
4 please simply say so.

5 I also want to remind you that it is unlawful to deliberately provide false
6 information to Congress. And you will have an opportunity to review the transcript
7 once it is prepared.

8 EXAMINATION

9

BY [REDACTED]

10 Q So, Colonel, please run through your background in the military if you can for
11 us.

12 A Yes. So I've been in the military since 1994. Began as an enlisted
13 servicemember, where I served as an electronic warfare operator flying basically
14 intelligence-gathering missions.

15 Went to college after a couple years as enlisted. After going through college, I
16 was commissioned in the Army as an Army aviator. Went to flight school at Fort Rucker,
17 and I've qualified in four different aircraft.

18 I've deployed multiple times, but I also have two combat deployments, one to Iraq
19 and one to Syria-slash-Iraq, and that was in 2017-2018. And my first Iraq deployment
20 was 2006 to 2007. I currently serve as the chief of staff of the District of Columbia Army
21 National Guard.

22 Q And as chief of staff, what is your job description? What is it that you do?

23 A So basically I'm the synchronization link between all of the commanders and
24 the staff to ensure the District of Columbia Army National Guard's commanding general,
25 all of his initiatives and his goals are met.

1 I manage the full-time staff for the D.C. National Guard. And then also, during
2 any kind of drill weekend when we bring all the soldiers in, do all the coordinating, as far
3 as the staff, to coordinate their training or any other exercises that they may conduct.

4 Q What was your position within the District of Columbia National Guard back
5 on January 6th of 2021?

6 A So on January 6th, I was the task force commander for Task Force Guardian,
7 which stood up in order to support the Metropolitan Police Department, which they had
8 requested support due to President Trump holding the rally just outside of the White
9 House. So I was the task force commander on that day.

10 Q Can you give a little bit of a job description? What is it that you do as a task
11 force commander?

12 A So task force commander, I'm the overall in charge of all 340 soldiers and
13 airmen, all D.C. National Guardsmen who were assigned to support MPD that day.

14 So I'm the primary liaison between the law enforcement agency and the District of
15 Columbia National Guard, as well as ensuring that at the time Major General Walker, as
16 the commanding general of the D.C. National Guard, his intent is met as far as how we
17 are supporting the city, how are we supporting the MPD.

18 So I'm the boots on the ground to ensure that everything the D.C. National Guard
19 is doing to support MPD, that we're doing it correctly and we're meeting the objectives of
20 both the D.C. National Guard and MPD.

21 Q And just to get on the record when you got your current position as chief of
22 staff. When was that that you started as that?

23 A That was in April of 2021.

24 Q Going back to your position on January 6th of 2021, can you run through the
25 chain of command above you on that day?

1 A Yes. So chain of command was, I was the task force commander. I
2 immediately reported to Brigadier General Ryan, who was the Joint Task Force D.C.
3 commander. And we stood up Joint Task Force D.C. on December 16th of 2020 as a
4 preparation for the Presidential inauguration, the 59th Presidential inauguration.

5 So that JTF was already standing up. I fell under that JTF with my task force, and
6 so I reported to Brigadier General Ryan, and directly from General Ryan to Major General
7 Walker. And then Major General Walker reported directly to the Secretary of the Army,
8 Mr. McCarthy.

9 Q And that JTF, when it was stood up in December, was looking toward
10 inauguration. At that time it was not incorporating January 6th. Is that fair?

11 A That is correct, yes. We stood up the JTF specifically for the Presidential
12 inauguration.

13 Q When did you first hear that the D.C. National Guard would be deployed in
14 support for January 5th and 6th?

15 A We started hearing -- basically the request came in the last week of
16 December. So we knew MPD asked for it. And we started the planning process as far
17 as, okay, we know MPD is asking for support and we'll start the planning process. But
18 we did not receive approval from the Secretary of the Army until January 4th.

19 So basically on January 4th is where I received the call to say, yes, it is confirmed,
20 we are going on the streets on January 5th to support. And that was the first I received
21 the confirmation. But we did receive the request from MPD. That would have been
22 the last week of December.

23 Q Can you go into what the Guard did between December 31st and
24 January 4th to prepare up until it got the actual formal approval?

25 A So the main -- we looked at the mission set. So the mission was to provide

1 basically support to MPD for foot traffic or pedestrians, as well as vehicle traffic and then
2 traffic at the Metro stations.

3 So we looked at the number of people we needed per intersection, the number of
4 people we needed per Metro station, and we started gathering the names of the soldiers
5 and airmen who would be available to support and started putting the teams together as
6 far as where they would go, who could support, and building -- we build a timeline. So
7 we built a complete concept of operations as how we will support this mission, how we
8 will support MPD.

9 Q And I want to get a clear picture of who you mean by "we." Is this done at
10 your level? Is this done below? Above you? Who are the people who are actually
11 putting all these plans together?

12 A This is done at my level. So at the time I was also dual-hatted as the
13 State -- we call it the director of operations and training. So I was also over all Army
14 operations at the time. So before I became the task force commander, I was already in
15 the operations realm as far as running day-to-day operations for the District of Columbia
16 Army National Guard.

17 So as that position, it was my staff, and then also along with the JTF, the Joint Task
18 Force staff that is stood up for the Presidential inauguration, we created the plan to
19 support the city, along with the logistics elements that goes with it.

20 Q Can you give me your feel for how long it took you to create this plan?
21 December 31st sort of led into the weekend, into a holiday, and then, of course,
22 January 4th is the approval. Did you use up all of that time to put all this together? Or
23 how long would you say it took you to come up with this?

24 A We used up all of the time.

25 So on New Year's Eve, I was up all night working on the CONOP. New Year's Day

1 I worked on the CONOP. The entire time we basically did not have a holiday as far as a
2 New Year's season holiday because we knew the possibility of this mission coming.

3 So the entire time we were working on the CONOP and ensuring that we had
4 everything correct and what exactly. And we were briefing Major General Walker at the
5 time also to ensure he had what he needed, and then we knew that that CONOP would
6 be briefed to Secretary McCarthy.

7 Q At that time, before January 6th, of course, did the mission assisting with
8 traffic control points and crowd management appear to you to be the right level of use
9 for the National Guard or did you think it was an underutilization of the National Guard?

10 A I believed it was the right level of use because it was something we had done
11 before and something that I knew MPD relied on the D.C. National Guard to support with.
12 So I understood the mission and I felt that, yes, it's the right level of use for us.

13 Q Captain Stewart Tarp told the select committee, quote, "The Guardsmen
14 were simply observing and reporting. If something happened, they were to report to
15 law enforcement, not handle it themselves."

16 He was speaking to the -- that was what they were meant to do at the traffic
17 control points, the Metro stops, the crowd management. It was not to handle it
18 themselves, but report it basically to law enforcement so that they could handle it.

19 Is that an accurate description of how you understood the role of the Guard was
20 envisioned on that day?

21 A Yes, that is accurate.

22 So even though we were deputized, so we were sworn in by the Metropolitan
23 Police Department, but we instructed all of our Guardsmen that you are not there to
24 conduct law enforcement operations, you are there to observe. If you see something,
25 you will report to a law enforcement officer.

1 Now, we always teach our Guardsmen if that law enforcement officer is in trouble
2 or if another Guardsman is in trouble, then you will respond. You have the right to
3 self-defense and you have the right to assist a law enforcement officer who needs the
4 assistance. But that was not our primary duty, was to go and enforce the law.

5 Q How did this usage of the National Guard for January 6th compare to their
6 use in the summer of 2020 protests?

7 A Well, during the times of the summer 2020 protests, I was actually in at the
8 National Defense University going through war college. So I did not directly participate
9 in those events. The only thing I can provide is what I was told from my coworkers as far
10 as what happened then, but I did not directly participate.

11 Q Okay. And this may then be a function of what you've heard from the
12 people you served with.

13 Were there any lessons learned from the summer of 2020, you know, some
14 criticism that the National Guard received about a low-flying helicopter, the Lafayette
15 Square incident, do you feel like any of those lessons impacted the planning or execution
16 of Guard assistance for January 6th?

17 A Being the biggest impact I would say is, you know, we knew -- we had
18 installed layers above as far as mission approval for any helicopters because of what
19 happened in June 2020. So we knew that I was not going to be authorized to request a
20 helicopter or launch a helicopter just directly.

21 We installed, I would say, some safety measures above that to ensure it was
22 getting multiple looks before a helicopter would be launched.

23 But other than that, the only thing I think that really affected us from June was I
24 really believe that because of the quick response that happened in June as far as
25 getting -- basically emptying out our building and getting as many people on the street as

1 possible, that if anything happened I would have that same support as a task force
2 commander, I would be able to get as many people as I needed as quickly as possible.

3 Q Did you think anything of the fact that the request came out on the 31st and
4 wasn't approved until the 4th?

5 A Yes. I mean, I was surprised that it -- I'm sorry. My computer's turned on.
6 I was surprised that it took so long. I actually thought the request would be denied. I
7 didn't think we would be approved to support it.

8 So when it actually came through with the approval, I was surprised by that.

9 Q Were your instincts that it might be denied based purely on the fact of how
10 long it was taking or were there other factors that made you think that?

11 A Only how long it was taking, and then my personal view on, you know, it's
12 the President's speech there. So if it's an official that's appointed by the President,
13 would he be willing to, you know, basically allow us to support in that way.

14 Q Did you speak with any of your superiors about that or overhear anyone
15 else's thoughts as to why it was taking so long?

16 A No, I didn't. I didn't. We all talked about as far as, hey, have you heard
17 anything? Do you think -- you know. But we -- I did not hear anything official as why it
18 was taking so long.

19 Q So between the approval on January 4th and then leading up to January 5th,
20 not a lot of time, but what went into preparing to assist the MPD as far as the soldiers
21 themselves? So, for example, did you train? And how long did that take?

22 A Yes. So coming in on January 4th, so we brought everyone in, all the
23 soldiers started gathering their gear. We broke them up into their teams and gave them
24 their team leads. But the main thing was to ensure they had the gear that they needed.

25 They were already trained, so most of the soldiers had already gone through their

1 civil disturbance training. And then anyone else who hadn't been through training
2 before, we did more of, you know, individuals where they could bring small groups in and
3 ensure they were trained.

4 But we mostly focused on ensuring we had all of the gear that we needed, the
5 vehicles, and coordinating with MPD directly as far as timelines, when do you want us
6 there, and that such thing.

7 On January 4th, I was pulled into several meetings with Major General Walker via
8 VTC with the Secretary of the Army and the chief of staff of the Army. They really want
9 to go through the concept of operations to see, okay, exactly -- basically Metro stop by
10 Metro stop, intersection by intersection, to see where will Guardsmen be exactly, you
11 know, how close are you to the Capitol, where are you, and then what are you, you know,
12 what are you doing at that location.

13 Q I do want to return to the training, but you mentioned how close you are to
14 the Capitol. Why was that a consideration?

15 A I felt it was a consideration -- this is no one verbally said this in the
16 meeting -- but I felt it was a consideration because the Congress was counting the votes
17 on that, you know, on that day coming up on the 6th. So I felt like maybe it was a
18 perception-type thing, that if the National Guard is stationed too close to the Capitol, will
19 the public assume certain things?

20 So that was a personal feeling, but, like I said, no one stated that, but that was the
21 feeling I had.

22 Q Were you made aware of limitations placed on the National Guard of 9th
23 Street being the cutoff and not assisting with traffic control points any closer to the
24 Capitol? Were you aware of that limitation?

25 A Yes, because I believe MPD originally asked for the South Capitol Street

1 Metro Station. I believe that was one of their original requests. And that one
2 was -- we had to end up saying no to that one and move it.

3 And then the other limitations that were definitely placed on me was, I could not
4 move soldiers from one traffic control point to another without the Secretary of the
5 Army's approval.

6 So I had to run -- which is, you know, very unusual. So I had a situation on
7 January 5th where MPD asked me to move a vehicle with four soldiers in it just one
8 intersection north, and from where I was standing in that intersection I could see where
9 they were moving. I mean, you could stand there and look.

10 But I could not authorize that move. I had to request that up through the
11 Secretary of the Army, and it took 3 hours. But 3 hours later I received approval to
12 move that Metro -- I mean, that traffic control point.

13 Q Was it your -- did that -- strike that.

14 Was that how it operated, from your understanding, in the summer of 2020
15 protests, that movement of resources had to go up to the Secretary of the Army?

16 A From my understanding, no, that it's -- not to that -- we call that the tactical
17 level -- not to that tactical level, you know, not that hands on.

18 Q Just to button up this issue about past 9th Street, what were you told as to
19 why that limitation was there?

20 A I really don't remember hearing exactly why the limitation was there. I do
21 remember one of the points that MPD wanted, and basically on the call, when we were
22 on the call -- on the VTCs with the SecArmy -- that it was decided, no, you won't be able
23 to put D.C. Guardsmen there at that point.

24 Q You did speculate that you thought it had to do with the military being
25 anywhere near or assisting a democratic process, the counting of the electoral votes, the

1 certification of those votes.

2 Walk me through why -- where are you getting that speculation from? Why is
3 that a feeling you had?

4 A Well, it was talk that maybe in June -- everything was so heavy-handed and
5 in June our employment was too heavy-handed. And so now, if we come back
6 now -- and there have been, you know, talk of, hey, well, you know, the President was
7 always -- already saying that he disagreed with the election, that it was fraud, so, you
8 know, would the public think that, oh, the military is going to step in, in some kind of way,
9 to stop the vote?

10 That was my perception. And, like I said, no one actually said that. But that
11 was the feeling I was getting, that senior leaders were actually concerned that it would be
12 viewed in that way if we were standing outside of the Capitol, we were very close to the
13 Capitol.

14 Q Outside of the perception, can you talk to me about the reality? Is
15 there -- if leaders had concerns that servicemembers, National Guard servicemembers
16 might abandon their posts and take what, potentially, could be construed as an unlawful
17 order by the President to assist in the blocking or delaying of the counting of the electoral
18 votes, how would you respond to that concern? What would you say about whether
19 that had the potential to occur or not within the D.C. National Guard?

20 A I would say absolutely not. I would say the D.C. National Guard, just the
21 soldiers that I know, the soldiers and the airmen, they're here to uphold the Constitution.
22 They are not here to support any one party or the other, any one -- specifically, one
23 President or the other, you know.

24 We're here to support the Constitution. We will support the President, but not
25 an unlawful order. And I definitely would not have followed an unlawful order or

1 allowed the Guardsmen to do so.

2 Q And I take it you would've considered even an order from the Commander in
3 Chief to assist in the blocking or delaying of the counting of the votes to be unlawful?

4 A Oh, that's, yes, absolutely unlawful.

5 Q So I want to get back to the training. You mentioned that everyone came
6 in with at least some base level or a lot of the servicemembers came in with a base level
7 training for civil disturbance. Talk me through that. When does that happen? How
8 extensive is it?

9 A So normally they would have a program where, you know, we would have
10 designated trainers. So these individuals who have been through different courses that
11 qualified them to train civil disturbance operations and then they would come in, bring in
12 groups of soldiers.

13 And it would basically be, you know, we'll do it on a drill weekend, you know. So
14 all day or all drill those soldiers would go through commands, movements, actually
15 physically putting on the gear. They even get to the point where they physically use
16 contact.

17 So they'll actually go through the physical contact. And it gets pretty rough out
18 there. We get -- some soldiers get injured in training.

19 But they go through the physical contact, I should say. So that's the training
20 process.

21 And because of June, we had so many soldiers who in June of 2020 ended up
22 having to go out on the street, that September prior we made sure to implement
23 additional training for everyone.

24 So in that September -- and I want to say it was because of the Martin Luther King
25 march. I have to look at what it was specifically, what event was coming up that we

1 were training for, but we even -- we trained more soldiers in civil disturbance during that
2 time.

3 Q Do you happen to know when the last drill weekend session was before
4 January 5th?

5 A Before January 5th, it would have been December -- that first weekend of
6 December.

7 Q And you feel confident that civil disturbance training occurred at that drill
8 weekend?

9 A I can't say for sure if it occurred then. I know it occurred for sure in
10 September. And I know that the soldiers and airmen that I had, if they needed any
11 training, we had the individuals there who took them and basically gave them the
12 training.

13 Q And you meant on January 4th?

14 A On the 4th, yes.

15 Q Okay. Talk to me about why there may be some gaps, why there are some
16 servicemembers called up for the 5th and the 6th who wouldn't have gone to one of
17 those weekends? Why did anyone raise their hand and say, "Oh, I actually don't have
18 civil disturbance training"? How did that happen?

19 A It's all depending on their MOS and their job. So you may have someone
20 who -- so, you know, the majority of the civil disturbance training would be conducted by
21 the military police battalion or within our 74 troop command, which has the majority of
22 our soldiers.

23 So say I have, you know, some aviators who may not really need civil disturbance
24 training until they know, "Oh, I'm going to be on this mission." So sometimes it's broken
25 down by their skill set, what their normal job is.

1 Q You did say MOS. For the record, can you tell us what that acronym stands
2 for?

3 A Military Occupancy Specialty. Yes, specialty.

4 Q Okay. And you mentioned that some of the work over the summer of 2020
5 provided civil disturbance training in real time. Is it the case, I suppose, that then there
6 might be some servicemembers who didn't participate in the summer and that's why
7 there might be some gaps and they would've raised their hand maybe on January 4th so
8 that they can get individualized training on that day?

9 A Yes. Because some soldiers who weren't there during June, you know, they
10 may have needed that training then so that they would've still needed it for. Or if you
11 had a new soldier who may have come back from a training. For some reason they were
12 away during June, you know, they may have been at training and now they needed that.

13 Q Do you recall if it was a large number of your soldiers who raised their hands
14 and needed that individualized training for January 4th?

15 A I do not recall the exact number, but I believe it was very small. I mean,
16 maybe like four or five.

17 Q Okay. This may be consistent with what you've just told us. Captain Tarp
18 told the select committee that his guys did not train in civil disturbance annually.

19 "Those who couldn't make the encampment order for that protest, they weren't
20 trained. Although a lot have gotten practice from the summer, there were others who
21 did not have that training and had to learn it pretty quickly. They can be commended
22 for that, but if anyone asks me if they were subject matter experts out there, I would say
23 that's not the case."

24 Do you agree with that or is that accurate?

25 A I do agree. They were not -- because you cannot become a subject matter

1 expert in a day of training. One day of training is to give you basic knowledge of the
2 commands, to be able to follow commands, to be able to defend yourself, to move on
3 line, you know, to operate as a unit. So you will not be a subject matter expert in one
4 day.

5 Q Okay. So to wrap it up, some members of the D.C. National Guard who
6 have spoken to us have told us, up on through to General Walker, this is what the
7 National Guard does, they do civil disturbance. This is in their bailiwick. This is their
8 area of responsibility. If there's anything that National Guardsmen know to do, it's civil
9 disturbance.

10 Basically, where do you land on this? What do you think about the level of
11 training at the point that we're heading into January 5th and January 6th? Do you think
12 the large majority of the Guardsmen do have quite extensive civil disturbance training?
13 Where do you land on that idea that this is within the realm of what the National
14 Guardsmen do and that they're sort of -- it's sort of natural to them?

15 A I do believe the large majority of the National Guard -- or D.C. National
16 Guard, because not all National Guards -- but the D.C. National Guard, yes, that is what
17 we do. And that is what, you know, we have done for years as far as training for civil
18 disturbance.

19 So if I was able to on January 5th pick the exact unit that I want -- which I'm not
20 able to do because, of course, we're a part-time force.

21 So, you know, if a soldier is working for MPD or working for Prince George's
22 County Police Department, you know, they're not coming in to support this.

23 But if I was able to hand pick from the D.C. National Guard who I needed for that
24 unit, I could have some very, very experienced soldiers on the grounds, experienced in
25 civil disturbance.

1 Q How would you characterize the level of experience of the soldiers you did
2 have for January 5th and January 6th?

3 A I would say with the mix, probably medium. I wouldn't say it was like high.
4 I would say probably medium.

5 Q In terms of this training on January 4th, I take it that the groups had not
6 trained together for civil disturbance. Can you talk me through why that might be
7 important?

8 A Yes. That is definitely true.

9 So we did not train together as a unit in civil disturbance. And that is important
10 because, of course, when you get into that situation and everything is happening and all
11 the loud noises and people are banging against you, you need to be a cohesive unit.

12 So you need to be able to listen out for your commands, listen at your squad
13 leaders, and move on line together. So we did not train together as a unit prior to
14 January 5th.

15 Q I want to make a distinction between the servicemembers under your charge
16 who are handling the traffic control points and the Quick Reaction Force.

17 Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] told the select committee that they, the forces
18 under his command, started training up on civil disturbance on the 5th and they did
19 training on both January 5th and 6th.

20 Is that your understanding as well, that for the Quick Reaction Force, they
21 did -- they were able to train as a unit together for civil disturbance and that's separate
22 from the servicemembers who were doing the traffic control points?

23 A Yes, and that did happen. Because the QRF's specific goal or duty and job is
24 civil disturbance, to come in and, you know, protect our force if we needed to, where my
25 Guardsmen who are on traffic control points and Metro stations, that was not their

1 primary goal.

2 Even though we had civil disturbance gear with us, you know, in the vehicles on
3 the 6th and also in a box truck, and in a box truck only on the 5th, but we did not train
4 together in that because that was not our specific mission.

5 Q And we'll get into all of that about the gear.

6 So let me -- but let me try to analytically separate the two groups.

7 So how many servicemembers are under your charge dealing with traffic control
8 points?

9 A At that time -- so we had split up into two shifts. So on the street at one
10 time we would have basically 90 on traffic control points, 25 -- or 24 on Metro. And
11 then I didn't include -- then there would be 4 in the command staff.

12 So we would have about 118 total on the street at one time in two shifts. So
13 that would be the group that was with me. And then the QRF with Lieutenant Colonel
14 Reinke, they were at Joint Base Andrews and they were together training.

15 Q How many of them?

16 A It was 40 total was supposed to be the packs, but they end up going to 41.
17 And the way I understood them going to 41 was one servicemember was either injured or
18 sick and they went away, so they replaced that person and then they brought someone
19 else in. And then they came back to 41.

20 Q So is it fair to say this total number, about 160, that would be the total pool
21 of when we get into servicemembers deploying for January 6th and assistance, that's the
22 total number that you would draw from in assisting the Capitol, or could be?

23 A I would reduce it because the Metro stops -- I did not -- because they did not
24 have multiple vehicles with them to move. So when I started creating a plan looking at
25 going once we jump forward to going to support the Capitol, I reduced it to traffic control

1 points, QRF, and my command staff only. So that would reduce it to, like, 135, I think it
2 is.

3 So the airmen on the Metro stops only had one van. It would have been difficult
4 to gather all of them together and then come in.

5 Q Yeah. The maximum limit because [inaudible] would be 160, right?

6 A Oh, yes. Yes. Correct.

7 Q Okay. Let's run through -- let me make sure I've asked everything I wanted
8 about this.

9 [REDACTED], if you're switching topics, can I just ask a question?

10 [REDACTED] I'm not switching topics. I'm just going to January 5th.

11 [REDACTED] Oh, okay.

12 BY [REDACTED]

13 Q Can I just go back? I just want to ask about the initial request.

14 So, Colonel [REDACTED] you said that you would have been able to pick civil
15 disturbance folks from who you -- from within the D.C. National Guard. Let me
16 understand it. If the request had been for civil disturbance rather than for the traffic
17 posts, would that have dictated which personnel you would choose?

18 A No, because for any of our missions, unless we are activated or encamped, it
19 is not an absolute requirement for National Guardsmen to come in -- leave their civilian
20 job and come in and support.

21 So even if it would have been civil disturbance, I cannot hand pick unless we are
22 encamped, an encampment order is put out, or we are activated by the Secretary of
23 Defense. Then it would make it a requirement for them to report.

24 Q I see. So if there had been -- and, again, forgive my ignorance on this -- but
25 if there had been a request by MPD or by Capitol Police for civil -- for stand-by for civil

1 disturbance protests, that wouldn't have changed -- that would not have changed who
2 you get to choose?

3 A No. It's still a volunteer force of --

4 Q I see.

5 A We put out the request who would like to come in support, and it's a
6 volunteer force.

7 Q Okay. And then just another quick question, again, based on my ignorance.

8 When you said you spent New Year's Eve and New Year's Day CONOPS planning,
9 can you just unpack a little bit what does that mean?

10 A Just breaking down like -- in fact, I have the CONOPS here.

11 So we just go through and we break down the number of shifts we need, the total
12 number of personnel per location, per vehicle, per Metro stop. We run through a
13 couple of scenarios as far as logistics on feeding, on, like, reacting to an event that
14 happened.

15 So we try to capture in the CONOP, okay, what if a pipe bomb or something goes
16 off, you know. We try to think about different things and say, okay, soldiers, we'll make
17 sure they fall back to this point. Then we'll gather together.

18 So it's basically planning, trying to think through the operation in a way -- and then
19 putting it together in a PowerPoint or a PDF in a way that we can brief senior leadership
20 step-by-step on this is our mission.

21 Q So I know when the initial request from the Mayor came in on
22 December 31st there was an initial request from General Walker to Secretary McCarthy
23 saying this is the request and there was a PowerPoint of this is what our plan is, correct?

24 A Yes. Yes, it was.

25 Q So then from the December 31st until the January 4th approval, are

1 there -- is there -- do you have visibility into the back and forth on the Secretary McCarthy
2 or above level, or are you getting any guidance from Secretary McCarthy to General
3 Walker to you, or is this, the CONOP, just the regular planning that you do?

4 A Just the regular planning that I do. And we're refining the initial CONOP
5 and refining different points in it and changing things. But I did not receive guidance
6 back from, like, Secretary McCarthy.

7 Q I see. So I think there was the initial request of 340 persons, and then it
8 shifted to maybe you'd only need 240, and then it went back up to 340.

9 Are you familiar with that?

10 A Yes. I do remember it changing, yes, going down and then going back up.
11 And we ended up with 340.

12 Q And was that done -- I think you just said this. This was done by your
13 group. It wasn't as a result of an ask from above.

14 A Correct. The number went back up when we looked at how many
15 individuals do you need actually at this intersection, and that's where we increased the
16 number again.

17 [REDACTED] All right. Thank you. Thank you.

18 Thanks, [REDACTED]

19 BY [REDACTED]

20 Q So let's talk about January 5th. Can you run through your January 5th for
21 me? Where were you and what did you do?

22 A So January 5th, we got up very early that morning. Our focus was, you
23 know, of course, to get everyone out on the streets and get to their points and getting to
24 the Metro stops.

25 So the first issue I knew we had on January 6th was we wanted to put the civil

1 disturbance gear into the vehicles, but there was -- media was gathering outside of our
2 D.C. Armory in the front area.

3 So we didn't want to pull vehicles around and just load up everything there. So
4 we end up putting all of the civil disturbance gear into a white box truck and we
5 designated a rally point for that truck that would be central to all of the different points
6 that we had.

7 And then as we got all of the soldiers out on the street in their position, my duty
8 that day, I just basically roamed from spot to spot, kind of patrolling, meeting with
9 soldiers and airmen, just making sure everyone is okay.

10 I would meet with MPD sergeants who would be over certain locations just to talk
11 with them and see if everything is going okay.

12 And that was the majority of the day. And on both days, I was responsible for
13 writing a situation -- a report to Secretary of the Army, to Secretary McCarthy, through
14 General Walker.

15 So every hour on the hour, I would write a report just basically saying this is how
16 many Guardsmen I have on the street, you know, where there's nothing significant to
17 report, if there's any changes. And I would send that to Major General Walker and he
18 would send that directly to the Secretary of the Army.

19 Q And just for the record, you said that the first issue you had on January 6th,
20 when you're talking about -- you meant January 5th. This is January 5th when the media
21 is encamped outside of the Armory and you're putting the civil disturbance gear in a box
22 truck, right?

23 A Right. Yes. Yeah. And that was on January 5th. And that was, again,
24 that was more of a media perception of, you know, if we have, you know, civil
25 disturbance gear, what is the reason for it?

1 Q You said that that -- those -- that truck with all of the civil disturbance gear
2 was at a point somewhere, right, in case you needed --

3 A Yes.

4 Q -- people needed to get to it. This is for January 5th, correct?

5 A On January 5th, yes.

6 Q So at this point on January 5th, none of this gear is in anyone's vehicle. Is
7 that fair?

8 A That is correct. On January 5th, it was not placed in the vehicles.

9 Q Where was this rally point?

10 A I would have to look at a map, but it was just south of -- I was sitting both
11 days at Pennsylvania and 15th Avenue -- or 15th Street. And so it was just south of that.
12 But I could pull up on a map and take a look.

13 Q How far from the Capitol was that rally point?

14 A Oh, it was closer to the White House. So, you know, to the west of the
15 Capitol. It was not close to the Capitol at all.

16 Q Why was civil disturbance gear brought out to that box truck on the street?

17 A As a defensive measure for the Guardsmen. If for any reason anything
18 happened, that we would need to be able to defend ourselves.

19 So prior to going out, there had already been talk of Proud Boys, Oath Keepers,
20 different type of groups that would be coming in to support, you know, the rally or hear
21 the President's speech.

22 And prior to, you know, in December, the Proud Boys, they came into the District,
23 and there was problems in, I believe, November, also the same. So as a safety measure
24 for the National Guardsmen like, hey, if there's anything that happens and we need to be
25 able to protect ourselves, we need to have this gear.

1 Q Does that -- is that distinct from the possibility that your mission may have
2 been amplified to include civil disturbance? Is the idea that this is self-defense gear,
3 meant to be used for self-defense, or it's gear that could be used or meant to be used for
4 civil disturbance should that become part of your mission?

5 A It was meant for self-defense for us, because in Secretary McCarthy's
6 approval memo he specifically had taken away release of the QRF or immediate response
7 authority from myself and from General Walker.

8 So, you know, we weren't thinking that we would right away be able to use that
9 gear for that reason, but we were always given the right to self-defense.

10 Q Was that move placing the civil disturbance gear nearby at a rally point, was
11 that either ordered or known by your superiors or did you do it on your own?

12 A It was known by my superiors, yes.

13 Q Can you describe for me what this civil disturbance gear consisted of?

14 A We had shields. So the riot shields. We had helmets. We had basically
15 like the vest gear. And then I believe the shin guards and the batons.

16 Q Okay. Batons were a part of the civil disturbance gear that was on this -- in
17 this box truck at a rally point?

18 A Roger, yes.

19 Q And you, of course, you saw the gear with your own eyes. It wasn't just
20 that you ordered that it be there, you know that it actually physically made it out there to
21 that rally point, correct?

22 A Yes. And I also saw the -- I saw the vehicle. And we had an issue starting
23 the vehicle later. So I had to deal with the issue of the vehicle being stuck out there
24 also.

25 Q And would this gear -- how much gear is -- was in that box truck?

1 A It was enough for every soldier and airmen out on the street, including the
2 Metro stops. So over 120 sets of gear.

3 Q Okay. And so that would be the people under your charge, not necessarily
4 the QRF?

5 A Right. Because the QRF had their own gear with them at Joint Base
6 Andrews.

7 Q Back to -- or still on January 5th. How did it feel out there? Was there
8 any tension or the lack of tension on January 5th with the crowds? Did anything about
9 how January 5th developed inform or concern you about how January 6th might go?

10 A Absolutely nothing. January 5th was -- I mean, the crowds were actually
11 friendly, you know. I would stand outside of the vehicle, or if I'm walking somewhere,
12 you know, everyone on January 5th was appreciative, you know, that we were there, and
13 there were no issues at all on January 5th.

14 Q I had a note here that you had mentioned that 340 soldiers were under your
15 command on January 6th. That's incorrect, right?

16 A Total. Because we were broken up into two shifts. So 180 total for the
17 TCPs, 48 total for the Metro stops. I had 40 on the QRF. I had a command and control
18 element that included logistics who was here at the D.C. Armory, about 52 there. And
19 then the CST, the Civil Support Team had 20 and they were supporting also. So total I
20 had 340.

21 Q Okay. What was your role? Were you the supervisor or commander for
22 all of them or --

23 A Yeah. I was the overall commander for all of them. And then over each
24 one, I would have a -- basically like an OIC, an Officer in Charge. So I had an Officer in
25 Charge over TCPs, one was over Metro, CST has theirs. Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] was

1 over the QRF. And then back here at the Army, I had an officer that was running the
2 logistics in C2. But they all reported to me.

3 Q On January 6th, did you meet with them, the soldiers under your command,
4 that morning? And to do what, if you did?

5 A I met with only the OICs. So the supervisors of each section, I talked to all
6 of them. Same thing before we headed out on January 5th, I talked to all of the
7 supervisors. And then on January 6th, I did the same.

8 Q Talk to me about where the civil disturbance gear was placed on
9 January 6th?

10 A So on January 6th, we were able to get everything into the vehicles. So
11 basically starting the night before on January 5th, as well as the morning of January 6th,
12 we put civil disturbance gear into each individual vehicle. We felt that was safer
13 because now we don't have to pull back to a rally point if needed. The soldiers and
14 airmen would have the gear with them.

15 So we were able to put the gear into the vehicles and we still brought the box
16 truck out that had additional equipment in it if needed. So the box truck still was out
17 there on the 6th also, but on the -- we also had it in the vehicles.

18 Q Why? What made you step up the placement from just the box truck to
19 now in the vehicles of these soldiers?

20 A Well, we really wanted it in the vehicles on January 5th. It was just more of
21 to keep perception down that, you know, the military is -- why are you getting all of this
22 gear? What is it for? It's just the President speaking.

23 So to keep perception down we didn't put it in on the 5th, but on the 6th we were
24 able to pull some of the vehicles into the drill floor, load them up there, and then also on
25 a side parking lot. Because we didn't have the same media, basically, scrutiny wasn't

1 looking at us. So we were able to put all the gear into the vehicles. But that was the
2 initial goal even on the 5th.

3 Q That concern about the media and the perception it might give the media,
4 who felt that? Who was communicating that? Is that you or is that something your
5 superiors were communicating?

6 A It was staff officers, different individuals. Never from, specifically,
7 from -- like my superiors never said, "Hey, you know, we need to do this." But it was
8 all -- we were already -- the D.C. National Guard was already under, I guess they'd say,
9 some scrutiny from the June, especially with the helicopters.

10 So we didn't want anything to look like, you know, hey, here's the D.C. National
11 Guard again, you know, doing something against civilians, which was reported in June.

12 So we just wanted to make sure that, you know, we kind of kept a low profile as
13 we're putting all the gear in.

14 Q I suppose I'm trying to figure out who ultimately makes the decision. So on
15 January 5th, it's decided too much media, we don't want to give that perception, let's just
16 put it in the box truck. January 6th it's decided, a little less media, let's move it into the
17 vehicles.

18 Is that you? Are you the one who makes that decision that now, okay, I feel
19 comfortable doing it on January 6th? Who decides that?

20 A On January 6th, yes. As we were coming back and I said, "Hey, if we can
21 put everything in the vehicles, let's get it in the vehicles now. Or if we can put it onto
22 the drill floor, let's get it in the vehicles."

23 On the 5th, I was -- that morning I was in so many, like, prepping and doing
24 meetings, it was done at a lower level than me. Some of my senior NCOs and Officers in
25 Charge just felt like, "Hey, we better put this in the box truck." But they did let me know

1 that, "Hey, this is the reason why we did this," and I approved.

2 Q I see. So the box truck idea actually came below you?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Okay. But then the moving from the box truck to the vehicles, that was
5 your decision when you felt not so worried about the media perception?

6 A Roger, yes.

7 Q And you've already mentioned that keeping it in the box truck was certainly
8 known by your superiors. What about this second move of yours to move it into the
9 vehicles, was it either ordered or known by your superiors, or did you do it on your own?

10 A I believe it was known. I did not have a specific conversation with anyone
11 to tell them that I was doing it. But I do believe that it was known that I was putting it in
12 the vehicles.

13 Q And did you feel -- I assume so, but let's have you answer -- did you feel that
14 that was within your purview to be able to move those resources directly into vehicles
15 without either getting the green light above you or necessarily informing them directly
16 that you were doing that?

17 A Yes, I did. Because we were approved by the superiors to say, yes, we can
18 have the gear with us as a self-defense. So I didn't think I needed to advise them exactly
19 on where the gear was, but I knew -- I'm approved to have it with me.

20 Q Captain Tarp told the select committee, quote, "We were told to load our
21 civil disturbance equipment into our rental vehicles on the down low, done so it wasn't
22 visible so it wouldn't look like we were escalating our role."

23 Is that right? Is that accurate?

24 A Yes, because we brought it in. We brought some vehicles onto the drill
25 floor and loaded it there and we also loaded some in a side parking lot. So, again, you

1 know, just put the gear in, but not make -- you know, not have everyone viewing that
2 we're putting the gear in.

3 Q And is that the same reason, even though media presence was lessened on
4 January 6th, you didn't want it necessarily to be out in the media that there was civil
5 disturbance gear in the vehicles?

6 A Yes. Same reason.

7 Q Talk me through your morning up until and after you hear -- you first hear
8 that there's trouble at the Capitol?

9 A Okay. So that morning I headed out with all the soldiers and airmen, again,
10 at their points. I came back to the Armory at one point because the Joint Task Force
11 commander, General Ryan, he wanted to go out on the street and visit some of the
12 soldiers and airmen. So he asked if we would come back and escort him in basically.

13 He didn't know exactly -- where exactly they needed to pull into because, you
14 know, MPD had so many streets blocked off and things were closed. So he asked if I
15 would come back and escort his vehicle in.

16 So I did. I had a command vehicle, which was myself. I had a driver. I had an
17 RTO, a radio operator, and a sergeant major. And he and I, we came back. We
18 basically picked up General Ryan's team and they followed us back to
19 Pennsylvania -- down Pennsylvania Avenue, close to the White House where the
20 President was speaking.

21 So General Walker -- I mean, I'm sorry, General Ryan wanted to walk around and
22 greet several of the soldiers and airmen while they were at on their points. So while he
23 was doing that, I had -- I told him, "Hey, sir, I have to leave you at this point because every
24 hour" -- like I said, every hour on the hour, I was writing a report that would go to General
25 Walker for the Secretary of the Army.

1 So I needed to get back in the vehicle and start typing out basically the situation
2 report. So at that point, I left General Ryan and, you know, he walked around, he met
3 some of the Guardsmen, and then eventually he headed back to the Armory.

4 Just before -- after he left, I knew a little escalation, I knew things were changing a
5 little bit where I could see in the crowd on January 6th was much different because I
6 could see like the Proud Boys. I could see different people with Kevlars on, with
7 bulletproof vests on. You know, they're all kitted up and they're wearing different
8 patches and colors. And I said, "Well, this crowd is definitely different from the crowd
9 that I saw on January 5th."

10 And I had one incident where I was just standing outside of my vehicle and I had
11 three guys, all in Kevlars and in bulletproof vests, and they're standing and they're kind of
12 looking at me, and I'm standing by myself outside of my vehicle and I'm looking at them.
13 And one of them said, "Hey, look at this piece of shit." And I just looked at them, and I
14 didn't respond.

15 And they were asking what -- they were saying, "Hey, what does he have on his
16 back?" And I had a black identification vest on. And I think they were trying to
17 determine if it was plates, like bulletproof plates that we've put in vests or in the vest or
18 not.

19 So at that point I knew like the crowd was much different than on the 5th.

20 Q All right. And what happened next?

21 A Those guys, they moved on and they, you know, walked past me.

22 At that point, the President had finished his speech, so the crowd started all just
23 flowing past us. Like I said, we're sitting at 15th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, like at
24 the intersection, and the crowds are just flowing past us heading towards the Capitol.
25 And you could hear -- you could see groups of crowds walking together, chanting things.

1 You know, individuals, some of them asking, "Hey, is it that way to the Capitol? Where's
2 the Capitol?"

3 So everyone was heading that direction. And then it just got to a point where it
4 was basically a ghost town out on the streets around that area. The only people really
5 on the streets were the D.C. National Guard, which we were in our vehicles or standing
6 just outside the vehicles, or there was a couple of Uniformed Division Secret Service
7 officers who were standing across from us.

8 I went over to talk with them, just to let them know and say, hey, I'm -- I wasn't
9 working with the Secret Service; I was working with MPD. So I just wanted to let them
10 know who we were, why we were sitting there, and what we were doing. And they
11 appreciated that. And they told me, they said, "Seems like everyone's heading towards
12 the Capitol."

13 So at that point, I got back in the vehicle. We were sitting in a vehicle. And
14 then one of my soldiers was watching CNN on his phone. So I was actually -- I was
15 writing a report or doing something. He's watching CNN on his phone, and he asked
16 me -- or he told me, he said, "Hey, sir, I think that there's been shots fired at the Capitol."

17 And I said, "Oh." I just, you know, I couldn't believe it. So I called our Joint, our
18 Operations Center, our JOC, and I said, "Hey, can you confirm if there's been shots fired at
19 the Capitol?" And they said, "Yes, we believe there has and we believe the Capitol's
20 been breached."

21 So at that point in my mind I said, "Okay, then they will be requesting the D.C.
22 National Guard now, so we have to move."

23 So the very first thing I did was I -- we pulled out a phone, looked at Google maps,
24 and we redesignated our rally point. Because my thought was we would all collapse to
25 this rally point, get together, get our gear, and then we could move up to help in any way

1 we could.

2 So we redesignated our rally point to the Capitol South Metro Station, just south
3 of the Capitol, because it had a parking lot there. So I said, "Okay, that parking lot's big
4 enough for me to bring some vehicles in and then it's close enough to walk up to the
5 Capitol."

6 So after we designated that point, the next thing I did was I called Lieutenant
7 Colonel [REDACTED] and I told him to get prepared. I said, "Hey, put all your gear on, get all
8 of your guys on the bus, get ready to go, because we're going to be getting a call soon.
9 So I need you to be ready to go."

1

2 [2:01 p.m.]

3

BY [REDACTED]

4

Q All right. Let me stop you right there.

5

A Uh-huh.

6

Q At what time was it that you, you know, called to verify that the Capitol had

7

been breached and you found out that it had?

8

A So, called at -- I have to check my notes again. So it was about 1415 -- oh,

9

no -- 1412. So when I called, to actually call back to the JOC just to verify. And then,

10

after that, I called Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] at 1417. And that's when I told him to get

11

prepared to respond.

12

Q Okay. So that's at 2:12 p.m. --

13

A Oh, I'm sorry. Yeah.

14

Q It's okay -- that you figure out that the Capitol -- or you verify that the

15

Capitol has been breached. And then at 2:17 p.m. you tell the person in charge of the

16

quick reaction force to get ready and to get on buses and to get outfitted. Is that right?

17

A Yes. Yes. I told him, have all of your guys put their gear on and get on the

18

bus. In my mind, this is about to happen really fast. So we're moving now, so get your

19

gear on, get on the bus; we will be getting a call soon.

20

Q Okay.

21

A So that's why I called him.

22

Q And then the other thing you do is you put together a rally point. Do you

23

go visually to see it?

24

A We were heading to go see it. We never made it there. So I only was able

25

to do a visual recon on Google Maps, just zoomed in to make sure that, okay, the parking

1 lot is large enough and is close enough -- you know, with civil disturbance gear, we didn't
2 want to be too far away that we're walking in with gear on and we're tiring everybody out
3 before we get there. So we needed a point close enough we could walk to also.

4 Q Okay. Was either move -- you designating in your mind a new rally point
5 and your ordering the quick reaction force to get ready -- either move either
6 ordered -- let's start with, was it ordered by your superiors or was this something you did
7 on your own?

8 A No. This was all -- I did all of this on my own. So I had not -- at this point
9 when I heard the Capitol was breached, I still have not talked to one of my superiors.

10 Q Okay. And maybe when we get there on the story, you can tell me when
11 ultimately someone above you finds out that all of this coordination has already
12 happened. But, at this point, you have yet to inform them that you've done it, correct?

13 A Correct. I have not informed them that I've done this. My first thought
14 was to initiate the actions and then get to the Capitol and link up with MPD. So I'm
15 thinking, where's the incident command post?

16 So, after I designate the rally point, the other thing I wanted to do is make sure
17 every soldier and airman knew where it was. So we had a roll call that we would use.
18 We would call on a radio, and they would all report in by their points, so, you know, 1
19 through -- I think it was 16. But they would go through each of their points and they
20 would call in and they would acknowledge. And every point acknowledged that they
21 knew where the new rally point was.

22 Q So what time -- is this still in the 2:17 area when you're letting all of your
23 men and women know that the new rally point is X and having them confirm to you that
24 they heard you and that they understand the new rally point?

25 A This is at 2:15. So, as soon as we redesignated the rally point, the call went

1 out on the radio right away. I called, designated the rally point, and then they all came
2 in and reported, reported in, acknowledged.

3 Q So how many servicemembers is that that now know the new rally point is
4 Capitol South and that's where, once we get approval of course, that's where we're going
5 to go? How many --

6 A That was --

7 Q How many numbers?

8 A -- 90 on the street, plus 4 in my vehicle, so 94 total.

9 Q Okay. And so this does not involve the second shift that was --

10 A This did not involve --

11 Q -- supposed to take over for the traffic control points. Is that fair?

12 A That is correct. This is only the personnel who were on the streets at that
13 time.

14 Q And these are men and women who have been there since the morning.
15 They're doing the first shift; they're almost done with that first shift of traffic control
16 points. Is that fair?

17 A That is correct.

18 Q Around what time was it that the second shift was going to relieve them
19 from their posts?

20 A It should have been 1600, or 4 o'clock. They should've come in around
21 4:00. Four or 5:00 I think was going to be the shift change.

22 Q Okay.

23 So, now, you've done these two things to prepare for possible deployment.
24 Obviously, in your mind, you know that approval of redeployment ultimately rested with
25 the Secretary of the Army, correct?

1 A Yes, that's correct.

2 Q Talk to me about what you assumed the approval was going to be like, that
3 you decided to get ready seconds after you heard that the Capitol was breached. Why
4 did you do that? Why did you assume that that was going to be necessary?

5 A Well, in my mind, it's the United States Capitol. I'm in the United States
6 military. As soon as I make one call, I will get clearance to go and support. The United
7 States Capitol was breached. I mean, this is unheard of. And, in my mind, it would just
8 take one call and I would have approval to start moving my soldiers there to the Capitol.

9 And then I was thinking that, you know, the Armory would be emptied out of all
10 full-timers. So I'm thinking over 300 people, D.C. National Guard, period, full-time
11 between different spots, would start flowing in. So I would have over 400 soldiers in
12 basically, you know, an hour, hour and a half, that would start coming my way.

13 Q What about the second shift?

14 It sounds like, you know, you got word to the quick reaction force. You gave
15 them the order to get ready. You have at least informed all of the men and women that
16 currently are at the traffic control points of this possibility by alerting them that there was
17 going to be a new rally point once the green light is given.

18 Did you do anything in this period before you've reached the command center or
19 the headquarters at MPD with those second shift at the Armory, or no?

20 A No, I did not reach to the second shift. Now, after -- once I informed the
21 QRF and I informed everyone who was on the street with us at that time, my next
22 thought was, I need to get to -- there has to be an incident command post. There has to
23 be a spot where they're coordinating this entire response. I need to get to that point.
24 I need to link up with MPD or Capitol Police. And then I can start bringing all of the
25 Guardsmen in once I find where their leadership is, and then I link up with them.

1 Q Okay.

2 Can you tell me why -- so, you know, you wanted to tell the QRF to get their gear
3 on and get ready. Why not the same command for the second shift, that they should
4 start, while they're at the Armory, getting ready? Why not make that call?

5 A I really -- you know, it did not occur to me to think, oh, go grab the second
6 shift now, because my thought was they would be a part of that force coming en masse.
7 Because I'm thinking the entire Armory will be emptied out, so all full-timers will be
8 coming, all -- everyone will be coming. So, when the Armory is emptied out, then they
9 would be with that group.

10 Q So did you ever come to know whether the QRF, under Lieutenant Colonel
11 [REDACTED] actually prepared for deployment as you instructed them? How did you come
12 to find out whether -- I know you gave him the order, but did he at any point, I guess,
13 relay to you, yes, we're doing it, we're ready, or anything like that?

14 A I remember calling him again and him saying, yes, they were basically ready,
15 standing by; they just needed a -- they were waiting -- they were going to get a police
16 escort. So they were -- from hearing from him, yes, they were ready to go.

17 I did not know they were going to the Armory first. I thought they were
18 coming -- you know, once he got everything, we received approval, that they would just
19 come to me.

20 Q And by "to me," you mean straight to the Capitol?

21 A Yes, straight to the Capitol.

22 Q So can you tell me that call, when basically you got it confirmed that, after
23 ordering that they get ready, that they be on the buses, that Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED]
24 has given you the, "yes, we are ready, it's done, now we're just waiting," what time was
25 that at, that confirmation?

1 A I would have to see exactly -- I want to say it was about maybe -- I don't see
2 it on my notes here. So I don't know if I should speculate, because I don't remember the
3 exact time. I don't see it on my notes there.

4 Q Well, can we get a feel for if it's, you know, 5:00, close to when they actually
5 were deployed, or whether we're talking --

6 A Oh, no.

7 Q You know, what hour are we talking?

8 A Oh, it was, like -- so, if I called him at 2:17, he was on a bus probably ready to
9 go by 2:40, 2:50, like, as far as them ready to move out.

10 Q All right.

11 So, now, talk to me -- you're heading in the direction of the rally point, just to get
12 a visual on it, but you end up -- where do you end up?

13 A So, also, while I'm in the vehicle -- so we were using Microsoft Teams as our
14 common operating picture. So I went onto Microsoft Teams, and I sent a text to
15 ██████████ who was a D.C. government employee who acted basically
16 like a -- she worked for the D.C. National Guard. She's a D.C. government employee.
17 And she would be almost like an intel-type officer. She would be a liaison with the law
18 enforcement agencies.

19 So I sent her a message on Teams asking her, do you know where the incident
20 command post is? And so she came back with the location, so we started heading
21 towards that location. But when we got in that area, which was just south of the
22 Capitol, we realized that there's nothing here. And there was only one officer there, an
23 MPD officer, and he was basically controlling traffic in that area. And he didn't know
24 where it was.

25 So I told the driver, I said, hey, take us now directly to the Capitol. So we came in

1 on Independence Avenue, and we got to the point where we drove close enough to the
2 Capitol where they have the metal barriers that come out of the ground, and we couldn't
3 drive any further.

4 So we got to a stopping point there, and I hopped out of the vehicle. And there
5 was a Capitol Police officer who was running the barriers, and I walked over towards him
6 to tell him, hey, I'm National Guard, we need to go in. He saw I had a government
7 vehicle, government plates. So he dropped the metal barrier, and we drove in.

8 And, at that point, we were driving basically right on Independence Avenue just
9 south of the Capitol, driving in. And we got to a point where we could not drive
10 anymore, because MPD was using that as their rally point. So all the MPD officers were
11 on that road, putting on all of their riot gear. So every -- it looked like every MPD officer
12 who was coming to support, that was their area to come in.

13 So we couldn't drive anymore, so I hopped out of the vehicle with my sergeant
14 major. And I said, hey, we're walking up towards the Capitol, we're going to find the
15 command post. And we started walking towards the Capitol on Independence Avenue.
16 And we got to, I think it's Independence and either New Jersey or South Capitol, one of
17 those little side streets that runs right up into the Capitol, and I saw a couple of MPD
18 vehicles, like, armored vehicles, and they were set up in a V shape. And, to me, it looked
19 like, okay, they're rallying around this V shape where these vehicles are.

20 So we started walking -- now we're on Capitol Grounds and we're walking. We
21 could see -- of course, there's people everywhere, and we could see everything
22 happening up on the Capitol steps. And we're walking towards the Capitol, and I see
23 three officers, MPD officers. They're running towards us, away from the Capitol.

24 And I recognized the one in the middle right away as Chief Carroll, Assistant Chief
25 Carroll. And I had known him for years just from working Presidential inaugurations and

1 different events. And so he was running away from the Capitol, and he had two other
2 MPD officers with him.

3 And I started yelling to him, "Hey, Chief, Chief Carroll," and he looked up and he
4 saw me, and he recognized me right away. And he just said, "Hey, come with me. I
5 need you now." And so I just turned, and now I was running with the other officers.

6 So we started running back across the street to Independence Avenue. As soon
7 as we got across the street, he had a police vehicle, MPD vehicle, parked there, and we all
8 just piled into his vehicle. I mean, there was stuff everywhere, but we just jumped in.

9 And then -- at the time, I still don't know exactly where we're going, but I knew I'm
10 now with Chief Carroll, who is one of the senior leaders with MPD. I believe he's a
11 deputy chief for operations. But I know, once I've linked with him, okay, this is -- I'm
12 able to link with the MPD leadership.

13 We went with sirens running, lights and sirens running, and we went to U.S.
14 Capitol Police headquarters. So, even though it's a very short ride there, because many
15 of the streets were blocked off, we had to go a route that kind of took us around, because
16 some of the streets were being blocked off. So we rode to the Capitol Police
17 headquarters.

18 And as soon as we got to Capitol Police headquarters, he and I jumped out of the
19 vehicle. I mean, we ran into Capitol Police headquarters, jumped into the elevator.
20 And before the doors even closed, Chief Carroll asked me then, he said, "How many do
21 you have coming right now?" And so I had to tell him, I said, "Hey, Chief, I'm working on
22 it. I need to make some calls, but we are -- we're coming, but I'm working on it now."

23 Q Okay. And when you said "we are coming," what did you mean by that?
24 Not necessarily that they're on their way, but that you're trying to work toward getting
25 them on --

1 A Right. Yeah, that I'm working towards it. Because, again, in my thought,
2 this is the United States Capitol. Like, as soon as I get up -- we're heading up to the
3 Capitol Police, their operations center. And I said, as soon as I start making these calls,
4 I'm going to have so many National Guardsmen just flooding this way. I just need to
5 have the location, have the plan set, be ready to receive them.

6 So, you know, as soon as we got upstairs, I attempted to start making my first calls
7 to General Ryan to start requesting the additional forces.

8 Q And this is Brigadier General -- what's his full name?

9 A Brigadier General Robert K. Ryan, Robert Kenneth Ryan.

10 Q And he is right above you in the chain of command, correct?

11 A He is right above me. So he is the Joint Task Force Commander, Joint Task
12 Force D.C. I'm Task Force Guardian Commander.

13 Q And that is as high as you've gone at this point? You have not spoken to
14 anyone above him, including General Walker, at this point, correct?

15 A That is correct, yes. I've only talked to General Ryan. And I basically -- so
16 Chief Carroll also, during this time, he took me over to Chief Sund. So I had never met
17 Chief Sund before, but he walked me directly to Chief Sund. He introduced me. And I
18 told Chief Sund, I said, "Sir, I'm working it now, and we will have as many as we can
19 coming as soon as possible."

20 And Chief Sund told me that -- he said, "I've talked to General Walker, and I know
21 you're working on it." So he acknowledged to me then that he had talked to General
22 Walker.

23 Q Is it fair, per your notes, that you arrived at U.S. Capitol Police at 3:10 p.m.?

24 A Yes, that is correct. So 3:10, right, is when I first arrived. Like I said, as
25 soon as we arrived, we jumped out of the vehicle, we were on the elevator and we were

1 heading upstairs. And as soon as I walked in, I was taken over. I met Chief Sund first,
2 and then I started right away calling General Walker -- I'm sorry, General Ryan.

3 Q So it's maybe a couple of minutes after 3:10 is when you get that
4 conversation with Sund, and now you know that he has spoken to General Walker and he
5 has put in formally the request for the National Guard to assist. Is that right?

6 A Yes, that's correct.

7 Q And let's just summarize the state of play right now before you're about to
8 call leadership to figure out if you got the green light.

9 You have already gotten, per your testimony, word from Lieutenant Colonel
10 [REDACTED] at the QRF that they are ready, they're on the buses, they're outfitted. You said
11 that that was around maybe 2:55 -- or 2:50, excuse me.

12 A Correct.

13 Q So, by this point, you definitely already heard in your mind the QRF is ready?

14 A Yes. In my mind, the QRF is ready, and I can recall -- once I get the
15 approval, I can start recalling everyone off of the points, the traffic control points. So
16 the 90 personnel, I can bring them in right away. And they know where the new rally
17 point is also.

18 Q They have not been outfitted during this time. You didn't order -- or ask
19 them to get their riot gear on.

20 A No, because I knew they had to drive in the vehicles, so I didn't want them
21 driving in the vehicles with the gear on. I would rather them drive to the rally point; we
22 would all -- they would get out and then gear up.

23 Q Okay. But you knew that their gear was there in their vehicles, so that
24 when they met at the rally point they had access to them.

25 A Yes, that is correct.

1 Q Okay.

2 And then part of your plan, I guess, then doesn't -- at this point, have you reached
3 out or has anyone made the men and women at the Armory aware that they should
4 prepare for a potential change in mission? Or you have no visibility into that?

5 A I don't have any visibility on that. So, at this point, I'm calling General
6 Walker -- I mean -- I keep saying "General Walker" -- General Ryan -- I'll correct it -- I'm
7 calling Brigadier General Ryan multiple times. I think I called him, like, eight times
8 within a, you know, 10-minute or 11-minute period. And I'm just -- I'm calling him
9 multiple times to get the -- basically just get the release, get the release of the QRF, and
10 then also get the release of additional forces from the Armory. So I'm asking him to
11 send me the QRF, send everyone that you have, you know, have here.

12 Q Okay.

13 And my last question on Chief Sund. I take it, it was a very short conversation.
14 Did he at all imply or mention to you concern about either that there was a delay in the
15 request, a concern that there may be a denial of the request, anything like that?

16 A No, he didn't mention that at all. But, I mean, his demeanor, of course -- I
17 mean, he was so concerned. You could see it all over him, all over his face and just in his
18 demeanor. But he never mentioned -- he just confirmed with me, yes, that he spoke
19 with General Walker, but he never mentioned any concern about not being approved.

20 Q So now it's 3:10. You've sort of assured Assistant Chief Carroll from
21 Metropolitan Police Department that, you know, help is on the way. You've assured
22 Chief Sund that help is on the way.

23 Now you're going to call your supervisor to figure out whether the green light has
24 been given. So talk me through that first conversation with Brigadier General Ryan.

25 A The first conversation with him, I first informed him, hey, sir, this is where I

1 am, this is who I've talked to, and they both asked for assistance. And I asked for
2 release of the QRF now. And I asked for, basically send all the additional forces, you
3 know, that you have now.

4 And his response to me was, we are working on it. So he said he was going to
5 coordinate with General Dean and General Walker, but they were working on it.

6 Q What do you do after you hear that?

7 A I took a slight pause, because I'm in the operations center and we can see
8 everything that's going on in the Capitol as far as on their closed-circuit TV, the TV
9 cameras everywhere. So I'm seeing everything that's going on.

10 I talked to a couple of Capitol Police officers and MPD as far as the location. So
11 that's where we came up with Lot 16 that's close to Capitol Police headquarters. So we
12 determined Lot 16, we could bring in all the buses and we could bring in all the National
13 Guardsmen there, and that the Capitol Police or MPD would have an officer who could
14 meet them there and then lead teams of the National Guard towards the Capitol.

15 So we already -- we created the plan of, this is where we'll rally point. We
16 changed the rally point for people coming to the Armory -- I mean, to the Capitol from the
17 Armory to Lot 16. That's just -- just close to Capitol Police headquarters. And, once we
18 did that, we knew that we could bring as many buses as we could there. And then, also,
19 it was a direct path where officers could walk the National Guard in.

20 And then I'm calling General Ryan multiple, multiple times, because, in my mind, I
21 can't understand why -- I didn't understand what they were working on, I mean, because,
22 you know, I'm seeing this, and I'm seeing that they need help, and I have Chief Sund
23 confirming they need help. And Chief Carroll, you know, he's looking at me, and he's
24 asking me, "Okay, what's the update? Are they coming? Where are they?" And, in
25 my mind, I couldn't understand, what are you working on? There's nothing to work on.

1 Just send everyone that you have.

2 So I'm calling -- I called General Ryan multiple times.

3 Q Okay.

4 And so, as you're calling General Ryan, you said that Chief Sund and Assistant
5 Chief Carroll are sort of checking in with you as to what the updates are?

6 A Chief Sund didn't check in again, but Chief Carroll did. And then there was
7 another -- and I can't remember his last name, but he was a U.S. Capitol Police officer,
8 wore two stars, I want to say, on his uniform. He would check in with me.

9 But Chief Sund, at that point, would leave from -- he would be in the operations
10 center at certain times, but then he would leave and go to his office that was, like, just off
11 from the operations center, in the back area. So sometimes he would be there on the
12 floor where everyone was, but then he would leave.

13 Q And just to make clear, you are the highest-ranking D.C. National Guard
14 official on the ground at --

15 A Yes.

16 Q -- this point, right?

17 A I am the highest-ranking. And I considered my -- at that point, I said, and I
18 am the liaison for the D.C. National Guard, I'm the commander for personnel on the
19 ground.

20 Q Okay.

21 And what is Brigadier General Ryan telling you? Anything other than just "we're
22 working on it"? Is he giving a reason for what they're working on?

23 A No, he never gave a reason. He only said that -- he said, General Dean and
24 General Walker are -- General Dean being the adjutant general and General Walker being
25 the commanding general. He said that they are both aware and they are both -- that

1 they are working on it.

2 And one of my last calls to him, I was on speakerphone, and other people in the
3 room told me this. They said they could hear the frustration in my voice. And I'm
4 trying to be respectful because I'm talking to a general officer, but I'm also looking -- you
5 know, I'm here with these law enforcement officers and I know they need help and I
6 know that we can help them, but yet I can't get people here to come and help them.

7 It was extremely frustrating. And so they all said they could hear the frustration
8 in my voice. I was just on the edge of maybe being disrespectful, but they said I -- but
9 they could definitely hear the frustration.

10 Q Did you start calling back to the Armory at any point?

11 A No, only to General Ryan. So, every time I would call, I would call direct to
12 General Ryan, because, in my mind, I wanted to keep the chain of command clean and
13 keep him informed, and he should be working it to send me, you know, additional forces.

14 Q You said that that final conversation with Brigadier General Ryan was when
15 maybe the frustration seeped through a little bit. Do you know what time that was?

16 A Yes. I have a timeline of where all the calls happened.

17 So that would've been that -- basically, that 3:38 call. That was the last one
18 before they really started talking about, okay, now they're actually getting on buses and
19 they're getting ready. So at 3:38 I see that I called out to General Ryan, and that was the
20 call.

21 Q Tell me what you mean by they started -- who started talking about getting
22 on buses?

23 A General Ryan -- after that -- so the next call -- so I spoke with him at 3:38.
24 He called me back at 3:39. And at that point is when he started basically telling me, like,
25 hey, it seems like we're getting everyone together. I think at that point here at the

1 Armory is when they started telling, like, the second shift and different people, hey, get
2 ready, get your stuff together, we're still waiting but we're getting everything prepared.
3 So that's when he started telling me, okay, they're getting prepared.

4 Q And so you, at that point, you take that not to mean that approval has been
5 given, just that that second shift has begun to get ready. Is that fair?

6 A Yes. And I'm thinking second shift as well as just personnel here in the
7 Armory. Because, from what I understand -- and, like I said, I was not here in June of
8 2020, but from everybody I talked to, they emptied this building out. You know, they
9 said, we need everyone on the streets now. If you are a National Guardsman, you work
10 in this building, we need you on the streets now. So they emptied the building.

11 And that -- in my mind, that's what we would do now. So I'm like, okay, they're
12 going to empty this building, and I will have 300 Guardsmen here pretty soon.

13 Q Got it.

14 But, in your mind, you know, when he's telling you at 3:39 that the people at the
15 Armory are getting prepared, in your mind, the QRF is prepared and doing nothing, just
16 waiting, and the first shift at the traffic control points, they're prepared and doing
17 nothing, in terms of, like, they're not getting ready for anything. They're ready to go as
18 much as they can be. Is that fair?

19 A Yes, that is correct.

20 And I spoke with -- because I considered pulling everyone off the traffic control
21 points myself, just saying, okay, forget it, I'm pulling everyone off the traffic control
22 points. It's taking too long, and I'm just bringing everybody here, and we'll come in and
23 we'll assist ourselves.

24 Now, two things. That would've been risky, because we had not trained
25 together in civil disturbance. But it was a risk I was willing to take, because I

1 considered -- in these circumstances, I said, okay, it's a risk I'm willing to take.

2 I mentioned that to Chief Carroll. I said, hey, Chief, you know, I may just pull
3 everyone back. And he told me, he said, well, right now I may need your Guardsmen
4 who are on the traffic control points, because all of my officers are here at the Capitol, so
5 I don't have officers out there in the city right now, so I may need to re-mission those
6 guys for other things. Can you just send me the personnel from the Armory here?

7 You know, so it was almost like we were talking about splitting. We'll use that 90
8 to support MPD on anything they needed in the city, but I can still get, you know, another
9 200, 250 from the Armory to come to the Capitol now.

10 Q So talk me through that, though. Did you feel you needed -- you need the
11 approval above to, let's say, move them to the rally point? So get them there to start
12 getting outfitted. That doesn't necessarily mean they've responded to the Capitol,
13 right? Theoretically, they could -- you know, let's say a denial came -- they could never
14 go. They could go right back, you know, to what they were doing previously.

15 Did you consider doing that? Is that what you're talking about? And why did
16 you feel you needed approval to get them to the rally point, if so?

17 A Well, I considered bringing them to the rally point to actually engage, to
18 actually put gear on and actually engage.

19 The reason why I felt like we needed approval, it goes back to that January 5th.
20 We had such scrutiny from the Secretary of the Army's office, I couldn't move four
21 soldiers, you know, one intersection, that I could see the next intersection. And that
22 was the amount of scrutiny that I felt like I was under and that we were under. So I
23 didn't feel like I had the clearance right away to pull them back.

24 Q And what's your understanding of the QRF at this point? Since, you know,
25 there's some concern about pulling, maybe, servicemembers from the traffic control

1 points. The QRF, you know, they're not doing anything at the moment. They're not
2 assisting Metropolitan Police Department with anything at that moment. And you said
3 that by 2:50 they're on the buses. So what's your understanding of where they are at
4 this point, you know, the 3:10 to 3:39, when you finally hear from Brigadier General Ryan
5 that at least the Armory is starting to get ready?

6 A At one of the points -- and I cannot pinpoint which call it was, but at one
7 point he told me, General Ryan told me, that the QRF was now at the Armory, which was
8 surprising to me, because I was not thinking they would deploy to the Armory. I thought
9 they would just deploy to me.

10 So I don't know exactly which call that was, but at some point he did tell me.

11 Q Right.

12 And so Lieutenant Colonel David ██████ told the select committee that he gets the
13 call to load the buses at 2:45 p.m., which is in line with what you're saying, that they were
14 sort of ready by 2:50 to 2:55. And he said that they're taken to the Armory instead of
15 straight to the Capitol as he expected. Apparently, he was also --

16 A Okay. He was told.

17 Q And by 3:50 p.m., they are at the Armory and ready to go. Does that sound
18 right?

19 A Yes. Yes. I know it was in one of those calls between the 3:33 call
20 to -- several calls with General Ryan -- to the 4:50 call -- and I spoke with him -- one, two,
21 three, four -- four times, five times within that period -- that in one of those calls he
22 notified me that the QRF was there at the Armory.

23 Q So, taking all of this, the different states of play, where everyone is and their
24 level of preparation, what is the fastest time, in your mind, you could've had D.C. National
25 Guard servicemembers respond to the Capitol, and how many?

1 A The fastest time? Within 1 hour, I'd say I could've had 135. So the 41
2 coming from Joint Base Andrews, if they would've headed directly to me at the Capitol,
3 and then the 90 I had on the street and the 4 that were -- including myself. So, within
4 that -- within 1 hour, I definitely could've had 135 there.

5 A And then, in my mind, within an hour and a half to 2 hours, I should've had the
6 entire Armory emptied out of the second shift as well as the full-time personnel here,
7 which would've been about 250 personnel total.

8 Q And so, when you mean within an hour, you made that call for -- you got the
9 traffic control point servicemembers to acknowledge the new rally point at 2:17, you said,
10 about 2:15, around there. So is 3:15 what you mean by when you say an hour, that by
11 3:15 you could've had 135 servicemembers at the Capitol?

12 A So I would say, based on the time when I actually arrived at the Capitol -- so I
13 arrived at the Capitol at 3:10. So, if I would've recalled everyone by 3:30, 3:40, we
14 could've been -- had gear on and walking towards the Capitol.

15 Q Okay. So then 3:40, 3:50 is what you're saying.

16 A Roger.

17 Q Okay. And so that's, like, about an hour from 2:30, when -- did you -- how
18 did you become aware of the first request that Chief Sund made to DOD officials for the
19 National Guard? Were you aware of it on January 6th or you found out about that
20 afterward?

21 A I found out about that afterwards. I didn't know about the -- like, the -- I
22 guess it was a teleconference or some type of call, VTC, with Chief Sund on it and
23 individuals from SecArmy's office. I didn't find out about that until after.

24 Q And so your earliest time would be 3:40 p.m. Is that correct?

25 A That is correct.

1 Q And is that already taking into account the earliest time that you would
2 recommend? Or are you giving me just the earliest time period? Or do you think that
3 it would've been feasible that that is a risk, as you put it, a risk you were willing to take, to
4 have servicemembers out there at 3:40 p.m.?

5 A To me, that is a feasible time. So looking at how long it would take for
6 everyone to drive from their TCPs, from their traffic control points, come to the Capitol,
7 put gear on and walk in, that's a feasible time.

8 Q And do you think that that time, 3:40, is a function of the preparation you
9 put in just minutes after hearing the Capitol was breached, the call out to the QRF and
10 creating a new rally point and making sure that every servicemember had that rally
11 point?

12 Are you, in part, able to have them there at 3:40 because of that sort of
13 quick-level stuff you did without having to go and get approval from your superiors that
14 you put in place before there was even approval?

15 A Oh, yes, it was because of the preparation. And if we did not have within
16 the approval that the Secretary of the Army -- when he approved the mission, if it was
17 never stated in there, "Hey, you cannot release the QRF without my approval," at that
18 very first call, when I called Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] the first time, I would've had him
19 come directly to me at that point. So we would've been moving even faster if our
20 original approval did not hinder us, as far as releasing the QRF.

21 Q You were concerned the risk -- you characterized the risk as the fact that
22 these 90 traffic control point servicemembers hadn't trained together in civil disturbance.
23 Is it fair to say that you didn't have that same concern for the QRF because they did have
24 that ability to train together?

25 A That's correct. They trained together. They were a cohesive unit. The

1 90, we were not a cohesive unit. But, like I said, in this circumstance -- and I've been in,
2 you know, combat operations, you know, two different deployments. At certain times, I
3 believe, okay, I have to take a calculated risk. And that would've been a calculated risk
4 during that time.

5 Q You did -- if you put it at 3:40 for the two pools of traffic control points and
6 the QRF, where did you put it in terms of the earliest that you could have the full Armory?

7 A Oh, full Armory? I would say -- so if we're, you know, 3:40 coming there, I
8 would say at least by -- I would give them another hour. So by 4:40 I should've had at
9 least 250 coming from the Armory. So --

10 Q So let me --

11 A That includes the second shift as well as full-timers.

12 Q Okay. And Captain [REDACTED] was in charge of that second shift. Is
13 that right?

14 A He was, yes.

15 Q Okay. He told the select committee -- you tell me if this sounds
16 right -- quote: "Affixing the helmet to the shield takes 20 to 30 minutes. Fitting the
17 equipment and making sure they're properly working -- the straps on some of them were
18 broken, needing repair. You'll see that there was dirt on the shields because they were
19 the same from the George Floyd protests." He says it took about an hour and a half to
20 don all of the equipment. This is, of course, just for the second shift at the Armory.

21 He says: "When it's on location, it's already outfitted to you. Most of the
22 soldiers were not military police officers. The only familiarity they had with donning this
23 equipment is when they were at the BLM protests."

24 So is that accurate, about the time it would take to get outfitted, those members
25 over at the Armory? Does that sound right to you?

1 A That I can't -- it sounds -- that sounds long to me, especially during an
2 emergency. But Captain Tarp was there, so I definitely can't say that, you know, the
3 helmets weren't broken like he said or parts weren't broken. But, to me, that sounds
4 like it would take -- it wouldn't take that long. And, also, there's a different sense of
5 urgency during an emergency.

6 Q Okay. You certainly -- did you feel like any of these constraints in terms of
7 being outfitted did take place with the traffic control point servicemembers, or that was
8 smoother or faster?

9 A As far as the -- you mean with Captain Tarp's group?

10 Q No, no, your group, the traffic control points. Did you have any concerns
11 about --

12 A Oh.

13 Q -- the time it would take them to get outfitted?

14 A No, I didn't have concerns, because each of the soldiers, in their vehicle they
15 were putting, you know, the gear that they had drawn into those vehicles. So I wasn't
16 concerned about the gear that was there. So if it was, like, broken gear, when they put
17 it in the vehicle before, they would've known, oh, my helmet's broken, I need to grab a
18 different helmet or a different shield.

19 Q What about the affixing? Would that still take some time?

20 A I don't believe it would take as long as what he is saying, especially in an
21 emergency where everyone -- normally, everyone assists each other. So if someone
22 gets their gear on, now they're assisting the next person, and everyone is assisting with
23 putting the gear on.

24 Q So Lieutenant Colonel ██████ told the select committee about what they
25 had. The gear in their kit included a helmet with face shield already attached, protective

1 vest, shin guards, knee guards, baton, and shield.

2 Does that sound accurate for what they had over at the QRF?

3 A Yes, it does.

4 Q So can you characterize the level of risk for a redeployment as fast as what
5 you're talking about? You mentioned just training together, and that was only part of
6 the forces that would be joining. Are there any other risks associated with a fast
7 deployment, or was that the only one, really, that was on your mind?

8 A No, it's -- the only risk is taking a group of soldiers and airmen into a
9 dangerous situation and we had not trained together. So, to me, that's the risk.

10 Q How long would it have taken for the servicemembers to meet at the rally
11 point, given the crowds and traffic and whatnot?

12 A By that time -- so the crowds were pretty much there at the Capitol. So,
13 you know, I would've said, them driving from their points to that rally point? You know,
14 15 minutes, 10 to 15 minutes. Because it was not a hard drive, you know, going down,
15 say, Independence, going straight down or going a little south and going over to the
16 Metro stop.

17 Q Talk me through, once they get to the rally point, what would they have
18 been outfitted with. Did they have their batons with them? What did they have with
19 them in the vehicles?

20 A They had the shields, the helmets, the shin guards, I keep thinking the vests
21 for it with the plates in it, and then the batons.

22 Q Okay. So they did have the batons with them in their vehicles.

23 A Yes.

24 Q Okay.

25 Was there still the box truck available for reinforcements?

1 A Yes, we also had the box truck without their -- again, with additional gear.
2 And it was just in case, like you said, if something broke or if you were missing this one
3 item, if for some reason someone didn't put it in the vehicle, we still had the box truck
4 with additional gear in it.

5 Q Were batons ever kept separately? Captain Tarp told the select
6 committee -- and this may be different for the forces at the Armory -- quote: "Our kit
7 was entirely protective equipment, overhead face shield," he calls them "Dick's Sporting
8 Goods pads and the shield. We drew back from the baton because we decided it was
9 too much of a risk to assume. Directed not to include the baton in the initial push to get
10 that equipment out there."

11 Do you know what he's talking about when he says that?

12 A No. That would've been the push from the Armory. So, coming from the
13 Armory, I did not know exactly what gear, you know, they were bringing with them. I
14 just knew they were coming -- CD gear.

15 Q And the QRF, what was your understanding as to where they put on their
16 gear, or would have put on their gear?

17 A I understood that they put on their gear at Joint Base Andrews so that, when
18 they loaded the bus, they already had all of their gear on. Because I'm thinking they're
19 coming directly to me, so I wanted them to get off the bus with their gear.

20 Q Did you ever find out why the QRF, ready, as you put it, at 2:50 to leave on
21 the buses, go to the Armory as opposed to going straight to the new rally point that you
22 had created by the Capitol?

23 A No, I did not. I never found out why. And, now, my understanding is that
24 maybe it was because it was taking so long to receive the approval from the Secretary of
25 the Army for us to employ. So maybe the thought was bring them closer so that when

1 we do receive the approval then they can deploy from there. But I never -- I didn't know
2 exactly why.

3 Q Did that move come from someone above you? Below you?

4 A It came from someone --

5 Q Or did it come from you?

6 A -- above me. It didn't come from me, no. I believe General Walker was
7 the one who said, hey, bring them here to the Armory so that they're closer.

8 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] can I just ask a question?

9 [REDACTED] Go ahead.

10 BY [REDACTED]

11 Q Colonel, I just want to understand, was there a difference between the
12 equipment that was kept at the Armory versus the equipment that folks had in their
13 vehicles?

14 A It was the same type of equipment, drawn from the same, basically, kit.
15 We call them sets, you know, civil disturbance sets. So they were the same gear drawn
16 from the same areas.

17 Q So it would all be protective gear, shield gear to respond to a civil
18 disturbance situation.

19 A Yes. Yes.

20 Q So the 3:50 arrival, I just want to kind of take a step back and make sure I
21 understand what that would include. Would that mean that those, I think you said, 135
22 folks would have to go to the -- does that include going to the Armory? Or does
23 that -- go ahead.

24 A Yeah. Yeah, that 135 would be everyone that was on the street and also
25 the QRF. So we would respond directly to the Capitol -- to the new rally point, and then

1 go from there.

2 Q The new rally point being the Lot 16?

3 A Lot 16 or Capitol Street South.

4 So, once I got into the -- our original rally point was Capitol -- or Metro Station
5 South. And then once I got into the Capitol and spoke with Capitol Police and also with
6 MPD is when we came up with the Lot 16. So then it would've been Lot 16.

7 Q And, then, would that also include that they would get sworn in or
8 re-missioned, whatever -- what does that mean to you when I say those words?

9 A So the individuals who are already on the street, we're already sworn in, as
10 well as the QRF. They were already sworn in. So we're sworn in by MPD already.

11 The only individuals that needed to be sworn in would've been any -- like, a
12 person coming from the Armory who was not already a part of my task force or hadn't
13 gone out on the street on January 5th, then they needed to be sworn in.

14 But everyone that was on the streets with me, including the QRF, were sworn in.

15 Q And, then, what re-missioning would there had to have been in the sense of
16 going from traffic control points to civil disturbance? What time does that involve?

17 A Well, it would've been a -- so the soldiers and airmen already knew that we
18 had changed the rally point. And they knew the reason for changing the rally point was
19 a possible response, because now everyone knows what's happening at the Capitol.

20 So it would've been more of just bringing everyone off of the TCPs, the time it
21 would take them just to drive, come to the new location, get out of the vehicles, put their
22 gear on, and then assemble with an MPD or a Capitol Police officer that would lead us
23 into their area.

24 So, for us, we would be assigned a sector. So, you know, Capitol Police would
25 say, whether it's this door, this corridor, this sector, we need you to hold this area. And

1 then we would hold that area as a group.

2 Q So this plan that you just described to me to come to the rally point, you're
3 there. An MPD officer or a Capitol Police officer is there. So there's not a mystery of
4 who they would report to.

5 A Correct.

6 Q Was all of this -- and they'd have their equipment. They're already sworn
7 in. Was all of this conveyed to General Walker as this is your plan, as the
8 boots-on-the-ground person?

9 A I can't verify it was conveyed to General Walker. I believe it was. But for
10 sure General Ryan. When I talked to him, I told him, hey, sir, this is where I am, this is
11 who I'm with, this is where we'll come. So that we did -- he knew that plan.

12 Q And General Ryan -- do you outrank General Ryan, or he outranks you in this
13 chain of command?

14 A He outranks me.

15 Q And he is with you physically, or is he with General Walker?

16 A He's at the Armory with General Walker. I don't know if he -- so I'm talking
17 to him over the phone. I don't know if he was in the same room with General Walker or
18 if they were directly talking. I don't believe they were in the same room, because every
19 time I would talk to General Ryan he would say -- he would go, okay, I will talk to General
20 Walker or General Dean, I will relay. So I don't believe he was in the same room with
21 him.

22 Q Did you have any direct contact with General Walker after --

23 A Not until later that night. I didn't talk to General Walker, I think it was,
24 until around 5:30, 5:50 -- 5:41.

25 Q And then my last question is just about the original memo, as you referred to

1 it, from Secretary McCarthy to General Walker. Did you see that? Was that, like,
2 pushed out to you and reviewed, or was it just told to you?

3 A I saw it on the 5th, is when I first saw it. And then I was on VTCs with the
4 Secretary of the Army during that time, who basically are, you know, saying the same
5 thing during the VTCs.

6 Q So it kind of went through those guidelines for the Guard.

7 A Roger.

8 Q Okay.

9 [REDACTED] Thank you, [REDACTED]

10 Thanks, Colonel.

11 BY [REDACTED]

12 Q So, to get the times right, ultimately, what time did the first servicemembers
13 from the National Guard deploy?

14 A They deployed -- so, now, I'm in the Capitol at that time, so I didn't
15 really -- until I started getting a text -- which, I kept the text from Lieutenant Colonel

16 [REDACTED]

17 So right here he told me at 5:28 -- or, I'm sorry, 5:18, it looks like they were
18 moving. And then at 5:29 he texted me and he said, "Hey, we just pulled into the wrong
19 lot, but we're going to Lot 16 now."

20 So they were basically on Capitol Grounds, somewhere in that vicinity, at 5:29.
21 So that's when I knew for sure that, okay, they are there. And then at that point is when
22 I started to move out to go meet them at the Capitol.

23 Q And that would be only the 40 or so from QRF. Is that right?

24 A The QRF and also the first shift. So he passed --

25 Q Oh.

1 A -- on to me also Captain Tarp, that Captain Tarp was along with him with the
2 second shift, the 90 personnel.

3 Q Right. You said "first shift." You meant the second shift?

4 A I meant second shift, yes.

5 Q Got it.

6 So, if we are saying that the first servicemembers, the 135 you had prepared to go
7 at 3:40 -- is it fair to say that that -- the amount of time that you would call a delay, that
8 was not necessary, would be just 10 minutes short of 2 hours? Because --

9 A Yes, that's correct.

10 Q -- it was actually 5:30, about, when the first forces were deployed.

11 A Correct.

12 Q And for the second shift that you were sort of giving a little bit more time at
13 the Armory, that was, you said, about an hour later, 4:40. So that'd be just under -- 10
14 minutes under an hour, a 50-minute delay that you don't think was strictly necessary,
15 correct?

16 A Yes, that's correct.

17 Q Okay.

18 And in terms of being sworn in, that QRF, you said, did not need to be sworn in.
19 Did that second shift need to be sworn in, even though they had been assisting with
20 January 5th, the MPD, the day before?

21 A They did not need to be sworn in. So they were already, you know -- they
22 were sworn in before they went on the streets for January 5th.

23 Q Okay. But if there were additional members of the Armory who were not
24 part of your group assisting MPD, to your understanding, were they sworn in at that point
25 at Lot 16 at around the time that they arrived?

1 A Yes, they were. Because we discussed that -- I discussed that with MPD
2 and Capitol Police, and, at that point, we decided anyone new coming in would be sworn
3 in by Capitol Police there. So the Capitol Police officers had someone there to
4 swear -- anyone who needed it would be sworn in there.

5 Q Do you know if any members -- there was any confusion and
6 servicemembers got sworn in twice, people from January 5th who were there or -- had
7 you heard that at all?

8 A I don't know for sure, but I can definitely see it happening, because I'm sure,
9 if an officer jumps on, they may have said, look, I'm just swearing in this entire bus
10 instead of handpicking who's getting sworn in --

11 Q Right.

12 A -- to make things happen faster. So I believe that could've happened.

13 Q Do you think your proximity to Assistant Chief Carroll and Chief Sund right
14 there at headquarters would've helped in coordinating the redeployment of the National
15 Guard faster? Do you think that was, like, an asset, to have you there?

16 A Oh, definitely. I think we could've made a difference, because, you know, I
17 was already there, linked with the MPD and Capitol Police leadership. So we definitely
18 could've come in and made a difference.

19 Q Did your superiors know that their, you know, highest-ranking ground
20 commander was there with the heads of the police forces that you guys would be
21 supporting? Did they know that you were there and that you were already talking with
22 them about the mission and where everybody was going to go?

23 A Definitely General Ryan up to General Walker knew. I do not
24 know -- because I've been asked this also before, did the Secretary of the Army know?
25 That I don't know. But I know General Ryan and General Walker, that they knew.

1 Q Because you certainly at no point spoke to Secretary McCarthy.

2 A Not until that night. He showed up -- he came to the Capitol that night,
3 and I did speak with him.

4 Q And by "night," you mean long after the Capitol had been cleared and the
5 forces have been deployed.

6 A Right. I think it was around maybe 10:00 that night, maybe 9:00 or 10:00
7 that night, when he came.

8 Q So did you guys discuss at all the delay or the reasons behind it or --

9 A No. Not at all. He came in; he came to meet with Chief Sund. At that
10 meeting, he promised Chief Sund that he would have 10,000 Guardsmen by that
11 Saturday. I believe the 6th was on a Wednesday. He promised that he would have
12 10,000 Guardsmen on the Capitol by that Saturday.

13 And he spoke to me directly. I was introduced as the senior officer on the
14 ground and that I would be the commander for all the forces that are coming in, the
15 National Guardsmen that were coming in. And he spoke to me directly.

16 Q Okay. So it was all talked about, the future response of the National Guard
17 now that January 6th has happened, correct?

18 A Yes, that's correct.

19 Q So what would have been, in your mind -- in your words, what is the mission
20 that your forces who would've been redeployed within the hour, what is it that they
21 would do once they arrived at the Capitol and gotten sworn in, gotten outfitted? They
22 head over there; what are they to do?

23 A In my mind, we would've held a specific point. So, you know, Capitol Police
24 at that time, they were holding certain tunnels, they were holding certain doors. And
25 our force would've been perfect for -- you know, we could've held certain points within

1 the Capitol, while that freed officers up to go clear the Capitol. So now they're not
2 having to hold a door or hold a tunnel; now they're free to go actually, you know, do law
3 enforcement tasks and arrest people and clear the Capitol, and I can hold that door.
4 You know, a small force can hold a confined point, and I could hold the door or hold the
5 tunnel.

1

2 [2:58 p.m.]

3

BY [REDACTED]

4

Q And this is as early as 3:40 when you would get the first servicemembers

5

there. This is what you envisioned them doing. Is that right?

6

A Yes, that's correct.

7

Q Okay. Would they --

8

A And my whole thought would be we would clear up MPD or Capitol Police.

9

Now, you go and start arresting, law enforcement duties, really clearing the Capitol,

10

inside of the Capitol.

11

Q Would they have required any sort of plan in order to do that, more than

12

what you've just outlined here?

13

A Not for holding a specific point. So, like I said, now, this is a risk. That I

14

will always admit. It is a risk because we had not trained together. But we're also all in

15

the military, and everyone has taken orders. Everyone has understood, "Hey, I can do

16

what we call a hasty plan. I can create a hasty plan on the spot and give directions, and

17

this is what we're going to do, and move out together in that manner.

18

Q And who was it in your mind that would have put or that did put together a

19

hasty plan?

20

A That was me. I worked with Capitol Police and MPD to create the plan.

21

Q And you mean the one that was actually used on the day?

22

A Yes. The one that was actually used as far as which lot they would come

23

into, who would meet them at the lot, and then who would lead them over to the Capitol.

24

That was between myself and MPD and Capitol Police.

25

So we never received any guidance there on the ground from anyone to tell us,

1 "Hey, this is what you should do," or, "This is the plan."

2 And I passed on to, like, Colonel ██████ said, "Hey, when you pull into this lot,
3 they will meet you there. This is who is -- you know, you're going with these personnel."
4 So I believe it's probably a Capitol Policeman that met him there.

5 Q Can you talk to me -- you've mentioned this before in our informal interview
6 about the body language, the tones of the folks who were coming up to you between
7 3:10 and 5 o'clock expressing their frustration with the National Guard not yet having
8 been deployed.

9 A Yeah. So I felt like I was letting them down, that, you know, again, I'm in
10 their operations center. I'm watching, you know, officers being beat and overrun in
11 different areas. And I know that we can assist. I know we can help.

12 And I think that both MPD and Capitol Police are looking at me like, "Hey, where
13 are you guys? I thought you guys were our teammates here." And I could feel like
14 the -- a disappointment, a frustration there of, "What is taking so long? I don't
15 understand, you know, what's taking" -- from their side.

16 And then I'm disappointed in myself because I'm not assisting. I should be doing
17 more to help them, and I'm not able to.

18 Q I understand you told me that Brigadier General Ryan never really
19 communicated a reason behind the wait, what it is that they were working on. I know
20 you said or you did have contact with General Walker, again, later that night when he
21 arrived finally at the Capitol.

22 Did you ever speak with him about what -- that night -- about what the holdup
23 was?

24 A No, I did not, because at that point the mission is still going on. Even
25 though we've cleared the Capitol, now we're changing to basically a security mission.

1 And I'm still the commander of all the National Guard forces there on the ground after we
2 start receiving more people. So my mindset was now still focused on what we're doing
3 now, the mission, and going forward.

4 So I never -- I didn't find out from General Walker the delay until probably days
5 later.

6 Q At the time, did you speculate at all about maybe the approval process being
7 delayed, you know, that it was folks at the Department of Defense who had not yet given
8 the green light? Was that obvious to you, I suppose, that if they had you would have
9 deployed faster? So maybe it's not speculation. Did you know that the hang-up was
10 somewhere in the approvals process up the chain?

11 A Yes. That, I did know, because -- and I should go back and say. So
12 General Ryan did say -- when he's saying, "We're working on it," meaning we're working
13 on SecArmy approval. So I knew that we had not received approval from the Secretary
14 of the Army. I knew that was the delay. I just didn't understand why it would take so
15 long to receive that approval.

16 Q Okay. So certainly -- so let me ask you this. Did anyone at any time tell
17 you that they were developing a CONOP for re-missioning your soldiers?

18 A No. No one ever told me, because I already had the plan there, and no one
19 ever informed me that there was a different plan or a different CONOP. Even when
20 everyone showed up at the Capitol that night, no one mentioned a previous CONOP, or
21 even a future CONOP.

22 So I was sent back to the Capitol the next day to plan the future mission with the
23 Capitol Police. I never received, you know, any guidance from, like, a, you know,
24 SecArmy level or down.

25 Q Okay. So then when you say that Brigadier General Ryan was telling you,

1 "We're working on it," it was not your understanding that he and General Walker on
2 down, that anybody above you at the D.C. National Guard was working on anything.
3 They were working on getting approval from above them. Is that fair?

4 A Yes. Yes. I should have been clear on that.

5 So it was very clear to me that they were working on receiving the Secretary of the
6 Army's approval to deploy us.

7 Now, when I say I couldn't understand, I could not understand what was taking so
8 long to receive this approval. To me, it should have just been a very quick thing to
9 happen.

10 Q And certainly no one at the time indicated to you that people over at
11 Department of Defense were creating or developing any sort of CONOP before granting
12 that approval, correct?

13 A No. I never received any indication or any of that.

14 Q Can you tell us a little bit what a CONOP is? So what would it look like in
15 this event? Had somebody been using that time to develop a CONOP and handed down
16 to you what would it contain?

17 A It would tell me, you know, exactly how many forces I'm approved, what is
18 my mission specifically, what mission am I tasked with, and who am I basically working for
19 as far as -- in this situation, we're support, so we're working either for MPD or Capitol
20 Police. It will tell me who I'm working for and what I'm authorized to do.

21 So if we're doing a quick, hasty CONOP, you know, I need to know what is my
22 mission, what am I authorized to do, who am I directly working for, supporting. And
23 then also equipment. What am I -- because, you know, of course, later we were
24 authorized weapons. So what am I authorized as far as equipment?

25 Q I suppose, you know, your answer may be it depends, because you can -- I'm

1 certain you can probably work on a CONOP for 5, 6 days if you wanted to trade off the
2 perfect for the good.

3 But, in your mind, in this situation, given, you know, what you already know in
4 terms of to which departments you would respond to the U.S. Capitol Police and what
5 you would be doing in support of civil disturbance, how long can you imagine if a CONOP
6 had been developed -- I understand you never received one -- if a CONOP had been
7 developed above you, how long can you imagine it taking?

8 A If it's a hasty type thing, I mean, no more than 10 minutes. Because I just
9 need -- just give me those four oversights, and -- because basically, you know, at that
10 level, you're giving me my guidance. These are your left and right limits. This is what
11 you can do.

12 So it wouldn't take long at all. Because I'm not thinking in this situation they're
13 actually trying to type out the CONOP and create a PowerPoint and do this. It's just a
14 hasty CONOP on these are your left and right limits, and this is what you're authorized to
15 do, this is your guidance. And I never -- I didn't receive that guidance at all.

16 Q And I know this is a hypothetical, but can you give me your maximum
17 amount of time?

18 So basically the maximum amount of time where, if you wanted to be as thorough
19 as you possibly could -- and, again, it could be 10 days. But within reason, what's the
20 maximum amount of time that you would say, "Okay, this really can't take longer than X,"
21 if you wanted to be as thorough as possible?

22 A Using this scenario?

23 Q Yes, this scenario.

24 A [Inaudible.]

25 Q No, this scenario.

1 A Oh, 30 minutes. I mean, in this scenario, in 30 minutes, you should be able
2 to hit every single point and understand, you know, even taking into account risk and
3 everything, in 30 minutes.

4 Q And is part of that because you were talking about how maybe, in other
5 times, if you're dressing up a CONOP, making a PowerPoint, typing it out, you don't see
6 the need for those sort of -- I don't want to put words in your mouth -- but you
7 don't -- those sort of things you wouldn't imagine being done in a situation like this. Is
8 that right?

9 A That's correct, because in this type of situation I don't have time to read that
10 PowerPoint. You don't have time to hand it to me or I don't have a way to, you know,
11 receive an email and read it and do all of this.

12 So, no, it would be basically a CONOP is created and then verbally given to me,
13 these are -- you know, "This is your mission."

14 Q But you did not receive one that day or ever. Is that right?

15 A I did not receive one on January 6th. I did not receive one ever during this
16 operation. We -- the D.C. National Guard, we created -- January 6th, I created the
17 concept of operation. Going forward, I worked with Capitol Police to create it. And
18 then our team, Joint Task Force D.C., created it for the inauguration. We never received
19 any assistance from anyone.

20 Q And, of course, Secretary McCarthy, when you say he spoke to you, shook
21 your hand on that day, did not mention a CONOP or a plan or anything like that, correct?

22 A He did not.

23 Q Did you come to find out what the Guardsmen and -women were doing at
24 the Armory during the wait? Do you know if they received any sort of instruction or a
25 CONOP while they were waiting?

1 A No, not that I had heard of. I just -- I was told that they were told to wait in
2 the bleachers, and basically they were sitting, waiting for approval to load buses and
3 move.

4 Q Was it your understanding -- and Captain ██████ talked a little bit about, you
5 know, they asked to raise their hand if you've never done this before, and they would be
6 paired up with others to teach them, so they were doing some drills. Does that sound
7 right?

8 A That, I was not aware of. I did not know they were doing that.

9 Q Okay. He does, though, say along the lines of what you said, quote, "After
10 the drills, it was hurry up and wait. Now we're all ready. Now we're all done. So go
11 sit on the bleachers and wait. We were waiting for an escort to arrive to take us to the
12 location. Stand by ready to deploy and stand by waiting for further instruction."

13 A Yes.

14 Q Okay. Do you recall how and when you found out that approval for
15 redeployment had been granted?

16 A It would have been on -- I'm looking at the calls from General Ryan. So
17 looking at the times, most likely it would have been -- he called me at 4:50 p.m. So most
18 likely either on that call or the one just before it at 4:15, most likely it would have been
19 the 4:50 call, he would have been telling me that, "Hey, approval, and they're on the
20 buses about to drive out."

21 Q Why do you feel that by 4:50 -- that's 4-5-0 p.m. -- that you had found out
22 about the green light for approval? What about, either from your notes, indicates to
23 you that that has to have been the time?

24 A Because, after -- looking at the times where I spoke with General Ryan, I
25 know after I received that call, and then I knew that I started texting with Lieutenant

1 Colonel [REDACTED] And once he told -- [REDACTED] told me that, "Hey, we missed Lot 16, but
2 now we're coming back around," is when I departed the Capitol.

3 I started at the Capitol Police headquarters. So I started leaving Capitol Police
4 headquarters to walk towards the Capitol.

5 Q And do you have a time that you for sure left the Capitol or the latest time
6 that it could have been that you left the Capitol?

7 A I would have to look at -- and I'm trying to pull my phone up here. I could
8 turn on -- I have a picture of when -- I know I took one picture that night of the Capitol, so
9 that would have been the latest time.

10 But I'm sorry, I turned my phone off for this. I'm turning it back on.

11 Q No worries. So you let me know when you know it.

12 But by this point I'm sure you've seen the official D.C. National Guard timeline that
13 places approval given to General Walker at 5:08 p.m.

14 A Roger, yes. I did see that timeline. So if, I mean, if that is correct, then,
15 like I said, General Ryan called me at 4:50 and at 5:39. So that was the last call I
16 received from General Ryan, was at 5:39. And at that point Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] I
17 was already texting with him at that point. So during one of those calls has to be the
18 one where he actually said, "Hey, they're moving."

19 Q You said 5:39. Did you mean 4:39?

20 A No, 5:30. So it skips the time.

21 Q Oh.

22 A So 4:50 p.m., General Ryan called me. And then again at 5:39 p.m., he
23 called me.

24 Q So you're saying it has to be between those two calls. Is that right?

25 A Right. Between those two calls, he had to have told me, because after that

1 is when -- and I'm texting with Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] here at 5:18, 5:21, 5:28, I'm
2 texting with [REDACTED].

3 Q Okay. Because I just want to clear up about -- you know, they're -- I don't
4 know if at this point you've seen that the Department of Defense timeline has
5 authorization at around 4:30.

6 A Yes, I have seen that. But --

7 Q And you -- yes?

8 A But, yes --

9 Q There is a lot of -- go ahead. You speak.

10 A Yeah. There is definitely a lot of back and forth on when the authorization
11 was given. I cannot -- now, I'm going off of -- only off of my call log with General Ryan.
12 And that's -- I knew it had to be one of those.

13 Now, it could have been the 5:39 time where he called me, and that was the last
14 time, you know, I talked to him.

15 But the only reason I didn't think it would be that time, because at 5:28 I'm texting
16 with [REDACTED] you know, so -- and, at 5:29, [REDACTED] -- they pull into the wrong lot, and then
17 they're heading over to Lot 16 at 5:29.

18 Q So, if I can summarize, you know, based on your notes, the two calls,
19 because you know Brigadier General over the phone is the one who told you, "We've got
20 approval, go ahead"?

21 A He told me that they were -- the group from the Armory was leaving the
22 Armory, coming to me. So not that approval to pull any forces off the TCPs, but that the
23 QRF was coming and the second shift from the TCP was coming to the Capitol from the
24 Armory.

25 Q I guess when did you find out that Secretary McCarthy, the Department of

1 Defense had given authorization, had finally given authorization? When did you come
2 to learn that?

3 A It would have to be that, like I said, that call, either 4:50 or 5:30. I can't
4 pinpoint, and I don't remember, but it was one of those calls from General Ryan. So
5 maybe it was the 5:39 call.

6 Q Okay. So that is -- and they're the same call. When you hear that the
7 Armory is heading over, that's the same --

8 A That's the same call. Yeah. See, so basically he just tells me during that
9 call that the second shift of the TCPs is coming to me and that also the -- that the QRF is
10 coming.

11 So he lets me know that they're coming. But they never talk about -- he never
12 mentioned additional forces, which at that time additional forces didn't come during that
13 initial push.

14 Q And I just want to be clear about what he told you. Is it that you took the
15 understanding that they were coming to mean that the green light had been given, or he
16 affirmatively directly said, "It's been approved, the D.C. National Guard, to come, we've
17 gotten the go ahead"?

18 A I took the -- by him just telling me that they are on the bus and their buses
19 are leaving -- are about to leave -- that we received -- he never specifically said,
20 "Secretary of the Army has approved."

21 Q Okay. And so you don't quite know the time when that happened. You
22 only know the time that the forces started to move.

23 A Yes. I only know when they started to move and from texts with
24 Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED], like, basically exactly when, okay, he's pulling into the lot
25 there.

1 Q And who ordered those forces to move? So it wasn't you. He didn't tell
2 you so that you can go ahead and tell your -- the servicemen. Because they're under
3 your command. So someone above you is the one who basically told --

4 A Yes.

5 Q -- them to move?

6 A Yes. Someone here at the Armory. And I don't know if it was
7 General Walker or General Ryan, but someone here at the Armory told them, "Okay, now
8 you can -- you can move."

9 Q And it would be one of those two since they're the only two sort of directly
10 above you?

11 A Yes. Those are the two commanders.

12 Q Did you tell anybody, now that you -- you know, either at 4:50 or at 5:30,
13 were you able to now convey to people there at headquarters that the National Guard
14 was coming?

15 A Yes. I told the Capitol Police and Chief Carroll, and the Capitol police
16 officer, I need to -- I have his name somewhere. I have to check it. But I told him and I
17 told Chief Carroll that they're now on the bus and the buses are actually -- they're moving
18 here.

19 Q Would the photograph on the Capitol, assuming it's before 5:30, clear up
20 which of the two times it would have had to have been?

21 A No. Actually, I -- and I looked, too, and I see that the only one I took at the
22 Capitol was later that night, was at 7:10. So I did not take one earlier at the 5 -- like,
23 when they pulled into the lot at 5:29, we waited about, I don't know, 15, 20 minutes, and
24 then walked over.

25 So we -- I did not take one at that exact time. So the first -- the first one I took at

1 the Capitol was at 7:10 that night.

2 Q And you said that they pulled in at 5:29, correct?

3 A Yes. So, at 5:29, yes, that's a text. Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] said they
4 pulled into the wrong lot. So at 5:29 they pulled into the wrong lot trying to reroute to
5 Lot 16 now. And, at 5:30, I responded, "Okay." So at that point they're
6 pulling -- pulling up there.

7 Q So is that -- could it have been 5:30 when they -- Brigadier General Ryan tells
8 you that, you know, forces are moving, they've gotten the green light? If the forces are
9 already there a minute before, does that -- is that possible, or --

10 A It's possible that he told me at 5:39, but I -- the reason why I don't think it's
11 possible, because I started texting with [REDACTED] earlier. So that's the only reason I think
12 it, you know, that it's maybe on that -- or unless on that 4:50 call he was just telling me
13 they're on the bus and they're about to leave, you know, but the actual approval hasn't
14 come.

15 Q Okay. Talk to me about your -- what you told Lieutenant [REDACTED] about, you
16 know, where to go, to link up with what person? Like, how are -- were you the one also
17 dictating orders as to where the QRF -- the plan for the QRF in this new mission that you
18 guys had?

19 A Yeah. So I told Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] that have the buses go to Lot 16.
20 And they were getting a -- an escort there. So when I had already worked with MPD and
21 Capitol Police, they also knew, okay, we're bringing them to Lot 16. So the escort knew
22 to bring them into Lot 16.

23 But I just let [REDACTED] know also, "Hey, you're coming to Lot 16. And when you get
24 there the Capitol Police will lead you into the sector where they need you to go."

25 Q And that is, as you mentioned before, a plan created between yourself and

1 Capitol Police, no one else in the D.C. National Guard above you, all the way up obviously
2 also to the Department of Defense?

3 A Right. That's correct.

4 Q Okay. Can you just run me through how the Guard was ultimately
5 deployed from, you know, swearing in until they finished their mission that day, how it
6 worked, how long it took, what they did?

7 A So ultimately they came in. They were able to come in and link with MPD
8 and Capitol Police, and they got on line -- they brought the National Guard in on line.
9 When I say on line, like a civil disturbance line. That would have been on the west side
10 of the Capitol.

11 And so they started pushing any of the rioters off of the Capitol at that point and
12 pushed them down towards the street area. And so they pushed them all out onto the
13 street, and then Capitol -- or MPD started arresting people.

14 So D.C. Guard started forming a corridor, which they would be on each side with
15 their shields, and then MPD would pull anybody they were arresting through that corridor
16 and then would load them onto a bus. They had a bus there that they would load up
17 everybody they were arresting.

18 After we did that, basically we stayed there for the rest of the night as a security
19 type force. So all of our Guardsmen from -- that responded on the QRF and that traffic
20 control point stayed there basically all night.

21 So we started receiving other forces to come in and assist from the D.C. National
22 Guard. And we didn't relieve those guys, I want to say, until the next morning, maybe
23 like 8, 9 the next morning. It may have even been later. But we weren't able to get
24 enough people in and get them relieved until the next morning.

25 Q Was there a delay in swearing in the officers that you know of? So Captain

1 Tarp told the select committee that, when they pulled into Lot 16, Capitol Police, that
2 they stayed there for about 45 minutes, that the Capitol Police came by bus -- by bus to
3 swear in the officers, and that it was a long wait, frustrating, he mentioned, because
4 they're sitting a mile from where they're going and waiting to swear in.

5 Had you heard any of that?

6 A No. I didn't know it took that long to swear them in, because Lieutenant
7 Colonel [REDACTED] -- and, one -- well, that group -- and that's why I say they didn't need to be
8 sworn in.

9 But I knew it could happen, that, yes, they waited to be sworn in. But Lieutenant
10 Colonel [REDACTED] group I don't believe waited to be sworn in.

11 Q Do you think the earlier redeployment of the Guard on January 6th would
12 have made a difference?

13 A Oh, yes, definitely, I know it would have made a difference. To get there
14 earlier, like I say, even if it was to hold a specific point and free up MPD or Capitol Police
15 to conduct law enforcement duties, clearing the Capitol, arresting, it definitely would
16 have made a difference. Or even if it's a psychological difference, because sometimes
17 people respond different to military than even they do to law enforcement. So even if it
18 was a psychological difference, we would have made a difference.

19 Q Talk me through that. What do you mean by maybe if the rioters had seen
20 military, they may have responded differently?

21 A Well, you know, in my, you know, sometimes in engagement -- and I've read
22 that some of the rioters were either previous military or even some current military.

23 So if they see, you know, a group of military coming up and they know that, okay,
24 these guys are most likely trained and willing to, you know, put their lives on the line and
25 put themselves at risk, you know, to defend the Capitol, it may not -- it may have cause

1 and effect to where they would, "Okay, well, maybe we won't try as hard to enter this
2 area."

3 Like I say, especially if I'm holding a certain door or certain corridor, you know,
4 maybe that could have adjusted some of the thinking of the rioters.

5 Q And, Colonel [REDACTED] can you remind me, did you send us your -- those notes
6 you were looking at, your timeline, did you send them to us? Or did you just send us the
7 call log?

8 A I sent the call log, but the timeline I was working off of was the same one
9 that General Walker has. I just used -- because I sent him those specific dates or times
10 for myself. So, like, when I met with Chief Carroll, when I met -- those are my times.

11 Q You have documented all the calls you have to Brigadier General Ryan. Is
12 that part of the D.C. National Guard timeline?

13 A No, but that is a part of the call log I sent you.

14 Q Okay.

15 A So the call log I sent, it has all of his calls on it.

16 Q I see. So all you have that is personal to you, what you have provided to
17 the committee, is the call log?

18 A Yes.

19 Q You don't have separate notes. Otherwise, you were just looking at the
20 D.C. National Guard timeline. Those are the only two documents --

21 A Right.

22 Q -- in front of you?

23 A Yes, that's correct. Yes.

24 Q I have one miscellaneous question, and I'm going to ask my colleagues,
25 before we get into recommendations for the future, if they have anything.

1 Can you tell me who the DSJA for the D.C. National Guard was at the time?

2 A The SJA?

3 Q Yes.

4 A The staff judge advocate was --

5 Q Is that what that is? Okay.

6 A Yeah. That was Colonel [REDACTED] So he was the staff judge
7 advocate. And he was with General Walker, so I didn't talk to him that day. But he
8 was with General Walker.

9 Q The abbreviation in the -- that I'm in particular looking at had a D in front of
10 it. Does that make sense, or no?

11 A Oh, yes. So the deputy would have been Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED]
12 (ph).

13 Q Thank you. I only ask because the committee has in its possession some
14 indication that she may have forwarded Facebook posts in which people were making
15 threats or -- to the National Guard, to the FBI.

16 Do you know anything about that?

17 A If it was, it would have been National Guardsmen. So as we started to build
18 up after -- and this is after January 6th. So when we started building up towards the
19 inauguration on January 20th, so we, when we started bringing in National Guardsmen
20 from all over the country, there was about four or five National Guardsmen who popped
21 like on the FBI list for certain posts they were making on Facebook. And we had
22 National Guardsmen also who were friends with them on Facebook reporting them.

23 So there was a National Guardsman -- D.C. National Guardsman who was accused
24 of being in the Capitol on January 6th, and people were forwarding his posts to her, to the
25 JAG.

1 Q Okay. All right.

2 [REDACTED] All right, guys. Does anyone have any questions dealing with
3 January 6th or before, not dealing with the future?

4 Looks -- hearing nothing, I think we can --

5 [REDACTED] Sorry. I think that you covered this.

6

BY [REDACTED]

7 Q I just want to get these two calls straight in my head that you have on the
8 call log.

9 The 4:30 -- 4:50 call and the 5:39, are those the two times?

10 A Yes, that's correct.

11 Q And when you get that call, are you still -- where are you physically?

12 A I'm in the United States Capitol Police headquarters, in their operations
13 center.

14 Q And are the initial 134 folks at the rally point, or they're at the -- are they at
15 the Armory?

16 A The first group that responded, they were at the Armory. They were
17 leaving from the Armory coming to the Capitol.

18 Q Okay. So the initial group of people never made it to the rally point. That
19 would have been your plan, but they went straight --

20 A Right.

21 Q I see. Okay. I was confused.

22 A I never withdrew all the -- the 90 personnel who were on the traffic control
23 points, we did not pull them off the traffic control points. In fact, they stayed on those
24 points until about 12 -- until like midnight before we brought them back to the Armory.

25 And that was also after a conversation with Chief Carroll that said, "Hey, all of my

1 MPD officers are here at the Capitol. I may need to use your other group out there for
2 other duties."

3 Q I see. So the initial group of people never actually left their traffic points.
4 If you had -- if the plan that you envisioned had come into play, they would have directly
5 come from the traffic points to the rally point?

6 A Yes, that's correct. Yes.

7 Q Okay. So my next question is, at 4:39 or 5:30, did you have anyone to
8 direct, or was everyone at the Armory?

9 A I still had 90 personnel out on the traffic control points, but everyone else
10 was at the Armory. So the second shift that would have been coming out to the traffic
11 control points, they were at the Armory, as well as the QRF. The 41 from Joint Base
12 Andrews, they left Andrews and they came here to the Armory.

13 Q Got it. And then the ultimate arrival time that the D.C. National Guard has
14 is 5:30 for the -- to the -- from D.C. National Guard to the Capitol?

15 A So I'm looking at -- actually, his -- or General Walker's -- the timeline. So
16 they have 1720, D.C. Guardsmen arrive at the U.S. Capitol.

17 Q Okay.

18 A I was definitely texting at 1729, is when Lieutenant Colonel ██████ told me,
19 "Hey, we pulled into the wrong lot, but we're rerouting to Lot 16." So I know for sure he
20 was on Capitol Grounds at 1720 -- or 5:21.

21 Q 5:20. Which would, in fact, mean that the 4:39 call was when the green
22 light occurred if they got there at 5:20?

23 A There is a 4:50 call.

24 Q Sorry.

25 A Yeah. And a 5:39 call. And that's why I say I -- in my mind, General Ryan

1 would have told me on the 4:50 call that they are leaving the Armory, because at the 5:39
2 call they're already there.

3 Q Got it.

4 A So he's not calling me -- and that's just me -- I can't, of course, say for sure
5 looking at the call log. This is just me thinking through it.

6 Q Right. No, that just explains what common sense would tell you, that the
7 5:39 call got there after their arrival, so the 4:50 call would be a, "Hey, we're on our way."
8 Is that --

9 A Right. Yes.

10 Q Okay.

11 [REDACTED] I have nothing else. Thank you.

12 [REDACTED] Can I follow up on that just very quickly?

13 BY [REDACTED]

14 Q Is it -- I'm just looking at how long it takes to get from the Armory to the
15 Capitol Grounds, and without a police escort it's about 10 minutes. And so, in your
16 mind, is it just -- is it possible, a possible scenario might be that you received that call at
17 4:50 and it did not give a specific heads-up that authorization had been given, that you
18 received the call -- you received a text from Colonel [REDACTED] at, I think it is, 5:29?

19 A Yes, 5:29.

20 Q That he had just now missed the parking lot. Is that right?

21 A Yes, that's correct.

22 Q Is it possible that you might have gotten a heads-up on the authorization
23 belatedly on that 5:40 call, that he had said, "Oh, by the way, we've been given
24 authorization, and that they're on their way"?

25 A That is possible. So General Ryan could have been behind in when he's

1 notifying me, and I'm already talking to [REDACTED] you know, and he notifies me later. But
2 I cannot -- and I'm sorry -- I cannot verify on which one of those calls for sure he said,
3 "Hey, they're moving now."

4 Q And do you envision any scenario where it would take, if they had gotten the
5 authorization at 4:50, where it would take 30 minutes for them to get to the Armory, to
6 the Capitol Grounds, with the escort that they had?

7 A No. It should not have taken that long for them to -- I mean, like you said,
8 it's 10 minutes. So it should not have taken that long unless -- there was barricades
9 around the area. So unless they were trying to work through the barricades, especially
10 with the buses -- they were on two large buses. So maybe if they were trying to work
11 through those areas.

12 Q Thank you.

13 BY [REDACTED]

14 Q And my last question on that is, Colonel, so let's say, you know, DOD has it at
15 4:30, the authorization was given. Does that earlier time, given your communications
16 with Colonel -- Lieutenant Colonel [REDACTED] how long it takes to get from the Armory, does
17 that sound feasible to you that anyone in the D.C. national command would have known
18 that authorization as early as 4:30 was given?

19 A I don't believe so, because even then -- so, if authorization was given at 4:30
20 and [REDACTED] was pulling in at 5:29, that's still an hour from the time authorization was
21 given for them to drive -- you know, and I would say, at the max, say if it took 15 minutes,
22 even if it took 30 minutes to drive from the Armory to the Capitol because of traffic or
23 barricades, that doesn't seem feasible to me. Just the timeline doesn't match up.

24 Q And just to be clear for the record, nothing that you had spoken to
25 about with your superiors, Brigadier General Ryan, would lead you to believe that, once

1 authorization would be given, that there would be any delay within the D.C. National
2 Guard to do anything past that?

3 A No. No. No. Because everyone was -- like I said, they were in the
4 bleachers, and that's from me hearing from other soldiers, that they were in the
5 bleachers, like, "Okay, waiting to go. They have all -- you know, everything is there.
6 They're just waiting."

7 Q All right. I wanted to ask you, what were the major lessons learned that
8 you took away from January 6th?

9 A Oh, wow. Sometimes when I -- I can talk about January 6th for hours.
10 So one of the things I would say right away is plan for every contingency, even if
11 you're not approved for that contingency, because things can, as you saw, can change,
12 you know, in a second.

13 And then the other thing is -- and I think we're still going through this as a D.C.
14 National Guard -- is our command chain, being that it goes up to, you know, Secretary of
15 the Army -- now there has been a change now where even the Secretary of Defense
16 approves all of our requests for any type of law enforcement duties. So now the SecDef
17 is approving requests also.

18 But we really need to power down to -- we have a commanding general, a
19 two-star general, for a reason. We need to power down control of any QRF authority or
20 any changes to mission or any of that stuff to the two-star level and allow them to make
21 the decisions, because on January 6th that was taken away from General Walker, which,
22 as we see, it delayed the entire process, where, if he had that, I believe he would have
23 released me, you know, right away.

24 Q And this may be speculative, but what about the way communications
25 worked on that day? Do you think that, if you had the opportunity to hear, as the

1 highest-ranking official on the ground, to hear or speak to Secretary McCarthy, that that
2 would have made a difference? Or do you feel that even him knowing all that you were
3 doing to prepare already, that there still would have been reasons for the delay dealing
4 with -- that are political?

5 Do you think that mattered at all, the communication of what you were doing and
6 what you were able to do and what you were seeing to the people who were making
7 directly the decision as to when the Guard could be approved?

8 A I don't believe it would have mattered. And this is -- and I, of course, like I
9 said, I do not know, because I didn't -- I wasn't on any of those calls. But I don't believe
10 it would have mattered. Even if I was on the calls telling them, "I am standing here with
11 Chief Sund, with Chief Carroll, this is the plan," I don't think it would have mattered.

12 Q And can you tell me just why? Where are you -- and, again, I know you said
13 it's partly -- you know, it's personal opinion, it's somewhat speculative. But you're
14 drawing that from somewhere. Where are you getting that feeling from?

15 A Just I've had the feeling -- I mean, from the time we met via VTCs on
16 January 4th and going into January 5th and the way it took so long to move a single traffic
17 control point, that, you know, it's almost like, hey, this is the -- this is then
18 President Trump's rally. This is what he wants. He is encouraging these people to do
19 this.

20 So how, in my mind, is how, you know, some of the senior leaders may have been
21 thinking was, "How am I going to respond against what the President had just
22 encouraged, you know, to happen?" So -- and that's just -- that's my thought.

23 And, like I said, no one has ever said that to me. No senior leader has said that
24 to me. That was just the way I felt during the operation.

25 Q So is it fair to say the limitations that were placed on the National Guard on

1 the 4th and the 5th, that sort of -- it made what happened on the 6th less surprising
2 maybe, that it's sort of consistent with the way they had sort of been reluctant to sort of
3 use the National Guard when dealing with this particular event, which is about the
4 democratic process and about the electoral count vote?

5 A Yes. It basically -- you know, January 5th, it was a direct indicator -- you
6 know, if -- me as at the time a lieutenant colonel, I can't move four soldiers on a traffic
7 control point standing on the street one block up to where I can see the next block, that's
8 an indicator of how much, you know, control and how much of the, you know, so political
9 the entire environment was. That's just a direct indicator.

10 And then, when we rolled into the 6th, the same exact thing happened. On the
11 5th it happened just at a micro level. Now on the 6th it's happened at this macro level,
12 and we're not able to overcome it in time.

13 [REDACTED] How -- I'm sorry.

14 And how was it conveyed to you that you had to get approval to be able to move,
15 you know, the Guardsmen for a block? Was that through General Walker?

16 Colonel [REDACTED] That was on the VTC on January 4th with the Secretary of the
17 Army. They put out that, "Hey, the chief of staff of the Army was on that call. You
18 cannot move a point, not a single point, without approval."

19 BY [REDACTED]

20 Q And you actually underwent that process on January 5th, right? You
21 described for us how you had to move them a block. You could see down the block, and
22 you went through the channels, and it took 3 hours. Is that right?

23 A That is correct. I went through the channels, relayed it up to
24 General Walker, requested to move. And 3 hours later I was given approval.

25 The sergeant who was standing on the street there for MPD, he could not -- he

1 thought I was crazy. He couldn't believe -- you know, he's looking at me like, "Really, I
2 want them to drive their car right there. We can stand there and see it." And he
3 couldn't believe it.

4 Q Did you have any understanding, visibility, did anyone explain to you why
5 that took 3 hours?

6 A No. I never was told why it took so long.

7 Q But it was your understanding that that needed to be approved by the
8 Secretary of the Army?

9 A Yes, that's correct.

10 Q Any other recommendations that you think the select committee should
11 make to avoid this sort of thing from happening in the future?

12 A I definitely think we need a clear chain of command for the D.C. National
13 Guard.

14 So right now, you know, it's set up where the Secretary of the Army can approve
15 certain missions and the SecDef approves other missions. Where you look at any other
16 State, it's more of a linear chain of command.

17 And I know D.C., we're not -- we're -- it's different, and we're not like, you know,
18 Virginia or Maryland. But I still think we can come up with a process that's a clear chain
19 of command.

20 And then, if not, then power down to the commanding general of the D.C.
21 National Guard, a two-star general, to empower them to control more aspects of the
22 missions.

23 Q Do you have a position on whether the D.C. Mayor could act like a Governor
24 in that capacity and approve the deployment of the National Guard for D.C.?

25 A Yes, it could work like that. Me, personally, I don't believe that it should

1 be, but just because I'm a history buff and the way the District was created and the way
2 the D.C. National Guard was created, I don't believe it should be that chain. But that
3 would -- that would work.

4 Q Is that -- you're saying because it was -- it's sort of like a Federal -- what do
5 you mean by history wouldn't look kindly or wouldn't comport with the D.C. Mayor being
6 the one to deploy?

7 A Because, yes, District of Columbia National Guard has always been
8 the -- basically a Federal National Guard, you know, working for the President down. So
9 it's just the history and the lineage of it.

10 But as far as would that structure work, yes, it would work, as we see in every
11 State, you know. And if D.C. becomes a State, then, of course, yes, then the Mayor
12 would become the Governor, and it would definitely work.

13 Q Is there anything we didn't ask you that you wanted to share with the
14 committee?

15 A I just want to, you know, reiterate to the committee that -- because I've seen
16 things out there where people have asked, like, why did it take the D.C. Guard so long,
17 and why, you know, why didn't the D.C. Guard respond?

18 And my thing is all of our Guardsmen were ready and willing. They were
19 capable, they were trained, and they were ready and willing. We just weren't given the
20 clearance right away to respond.

21 So I just -- for everyone I talk to -- and I've had the opportunity to speak at a
22 couple of different classes about this, defense civil support classes about it, and my thing
23 is that, hey, the District of Columbia National Guard was ready. We just weren't given
24 the opportunity to respond the way we were capable of responding.

25 [REDACTED] Anyone on the call on our side have any questions before we let

1 the Colonel go?

2 [REDACTED] No. I just wanted to say thank you, Colonel [REDACTED] I really
3 appreciate it. It's very helpful, both the account of what happened, but also your
4 thoughts on the recommendations. Thanks very much for your time.

5 Colonel [REDACTED] Roger. Thank you.

6 [REDACTED] Perfect. Thank you so much, Colonel. We appreciate the time
7 you've taken out here today to speak with us. And that will conclude the interview.

8 [REDACTED] Thank you so much.

9 Colonel [REDACTED] Thank you. Thank you.

10 [REDACTED] Thanks.

11 [Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

Witness Name

Date